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INTRODUCTION
While often overlooked, footnotes occasionally foreshadow
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1

groundbreaking legal revolutions. No better example exists
than the celebrated footnote four of United States v. Carolene
2
Products Co. Emerging from “below the line,” footnote four reoriented the Supreme Court’s approach to Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence, isolating “discrete and insular minorities” as the building block for what would later become the
3
Court’s suspect classification doctrine.
Identifying such path-breaking footnotes all too frequently
requires making sense of the doctrinal tea leaves, especially
given the uncertain importance granted propositions of law
buried beneath the text. But in the Supreme Court’s recent decision Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, a new footnote four makes a
bold assertion—holding that the “ministerial exception” serves
4
as an affirmative defense as opposed to a jurisdictional bar —
that rests on a radically new conception of the relationship between church and state, gesturing towards an increasingly
symbiotic relationship between religious institutions and civil
5
courts.
By contrast and for some years, a wide range of scholars on
both sides of the political spectrum had conceptualized the relationship between religious institutions and civil courts as “ju6
risdictional.” That is, scholars converged on the view that the
1. See J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 293–94 (1989).
For more critical assessments of the proliferation of footnotes generally, see
Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1131
(1987); Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647 (1985).
2. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
3. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 (1980); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1289–91 (1982); see
also Dan T. Coenen, The Future of Footnote Four, 41 GA. L. REV. 797, 798
(2007) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products
Co. generated the most famous footnote—and perhaps the most famous passage—in all of the American Judiciary’s treatment of constitutional law.”);
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 758 (2011)
(noting that footnote four of Carolene Products is “[v]iewed by many as the
fountainhead of the heightened scrutiny framework for minority groups”).
4. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012) (“We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra notes 65–67. I do not here reference the debates over whether and to what extent the Establishment Clause was aimed at the relative authority of state and federal government over religion. For examples of scholars
addressing this issue, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32–42
(1998); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 101–07
(2002); Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Un-
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religion clauses deprived courts of subject-matter jurisdiction
7
over religious claims such as religious defamation, religious
8
9
10
employment, communal shunning, clergy malpractice, and
11
religious contracts. Placing increasing emphasis on the Establishment Clause, a growing number of scholars argued that
claims implicating “questions of discipline, or of faith, or eccle12
siastical rule, custom, or law” were properly within the sole
province of religious institutions.
The jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses found
champions among scholars advocating for a robust “church autonomy doctrine,” which provided religious institutions with a
right to direct their own internal affairs free from government
derstandings of the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479 (2006); Douglas
Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155
(2004); Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 734
(D.N.J. 1999); Farley v. Wis. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286,
1288 (D. Minn. 1993); Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami Inc., 712 So. 2d 775, 776–
77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balt.,
683 A.2d 808, 813 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Abdelhak v. Jewish Press Inc.,
985 A.2d 197, 200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
8. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (noting uniform acceptance
of the ministerial exception by federal courts of appeals); Alcazar v. Corp. of
the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 2010); Bryce
v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002).
9. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875,
881 (9th Cir. 1987); Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30,
34 (D.D.C. 1990); Sands v. Living Word Fellowship, 34 P.3d 955, 959 (Alaska
2001); Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., No. M200401066-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 161035, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007); see
also Justin K. Miller, Comment, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Religious Shunning and the Free Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 272
(1988).
10. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Nally v. Grace Comm. Church, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1988); Wisniewski v.
Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); H.R.B. v. J.L.G.,
913 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703
(N.J. 1997); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); White
v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1318–19 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
11. See, e.g., Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104–05 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
12. Ogle v. Hocker, 279 F. App’x 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871)); Bryce, 289 F.3d at 655 (“This
church autonomy doctrine prohibits civil court review of internal church disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity.”); see
also Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008); Minker v. Balt.
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
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interference. On such an account, the Establishment Clause
instructed courts to stay out of religious disputes for fear of encroaching on the jurisdiction of religious institutions. Proponents of this vision of “dual jurisdictions” emphasize the important values promoted by a jurisdictional approach to the
relationship between church and state: the limited authority of
14
15
the state and the free development of religious life. Thus, by
granting religious institutions sole authority over matters of religious doctrine, discipline and governance, the state recognizes
the independent autonomy of religious institutions and provides those institutions with the space to control core religious
matters.
Ironically, the jurisdictional approach to the relationship
between church and state also resonated with scholars who explicitly rejected the claim that “religious institutions are pre16
sumptively autonomous.” Thus, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle
argued that courts are constitutionally prohibited from adjudi13. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 175
(2011); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Organizational Freedom and Conditions on
Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 177 (2009); Carl H.
Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1998); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL.
L. REV. 273, 288 (2008); Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 156, 161–62 (2011) [hereinafter Horwitz, Act III];
Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 87 (2009) [hereinafter Horwitz,
Churches as First Amendment Institutions]; Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception,
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 43, 48–49 (2008); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV.
1111, 1167 (2011).
14. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 67 (“[R]eligions that point to a
transcendent authority help check the power of the modern nation-state. This
is because such religions refuse to recognize the state‘s sovereignty as absolute.”); Kalscheur, supra note 13, at 91–96 (describing how conceptualizing the
ministerial exception as jurisdictional reaffirms the “penultimacy of the
state”).
15. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 63 (“Rather, the aim of the Clause
is for government to avoid activities that harm the integrity of religion
(religare) or religious organizations (the ekklesia).”); Horwitz, Churches as
First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 114 (concluding that under “a
sphere sovereignty approach to religious entities,” religious institutions
“would coexist alongside the state . . . serving a vital role in furthering selffulfillment, the development of a religious community, and the development of
public discourse”).
16. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 78–79 (2002).
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cating religious claims not because of some constitutional desire to “systematically protect the interests of certain classes of
17
parties, defined by religious mission.” Instead, the Establishment Clause imposes a jurisdictional bar on judicial resolution
of religious claims because such “claims would require courts to
18
answer questions that the state is not competent to address.”
Accordingly, courts cannot interfere in such matters on a theory of “adjudicative disability”—the state simply has “limited ju19
risprudential competence” to decide such religious matters.
Notwithstanding the conflicting theoretical underpinnings—one focused on the freedom of religious institutions and
the other on the adjudicative disability of courts—both groups
agreed that courts lacked the necessary subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve claims implicating religious matters. Such an
approach has important and practical implications. Most notably, if courts are jurisdictionally barred from adjudicating religious claims, then courts can and must raise such constitutional worries sua sponte, irrespective of whether the parties raise
20
them. For example, if a minister brings suit against a religious institution for violating employment discrimination statutes, the court must raise the “ministerial exception” defense
21
regardless of whether the religious institution does so.
This would be true even if both parties want a court to resolve a dispute—maybe on account that the dispute is simply
too intractable to resolve within the institution’s own adjudicative framework. Put differently, religious institutions cannot
prevent courts from dismissing religious claims on constitutional grounds—that is, they cannot waive such claims—
because the constitutional restrictions on judicial resolution of
religious claims are not rights to be asserted by the religious
22
institution; they are jurisdictional limitations on what a court
23
can do.
17. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations:
Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 119, 122 (2009).
18. Id. at 138; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct
and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1815.
19. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 123.
20. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445, 455 (2002)
(“[R]ights, because they are personal, can be waived by the rights-holder.
Whereas structure, because it is there to benefit the entire body politic, cannot
be waived.”).
21. See Horwitz, Act III, supra note 13, at 161–62.
22. Esbeck, supra note 13, at 58 n.236 (“A free exercise right could be
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Indeed, this approach to church-state relations made quite
a lot of sense in the wake of Employment Division v. Smith. In
Smith, the Supreme Court held that individuals had no free exercise right of accommodation from facially neutral and gener24
ally applicable laws. Such a holding appeared to undermine
doctrines like the ministerial exception: If the Free Exercise
Clause did not require accommodation of religious practices
otherwise prohibited by facially neutral and generally applicable laws, then why should the constitution shield religious institutions from liability under employment discrimination statutes when such statutes were undeniably facially neutral and
25
generally applicable?
A jurisdictional approach provided a very easy answer. The
Free Exercise Clause requires accommodation of neither indi26
viduals nor institutions. However, the Establishment Clause
does deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims
that implicate religious doctrine, practice, discipline and gov27
ernance. This is a limitation on judicial authority—not a right
28
granted to religious institutions.
However, this jurisdictional picture of judicial authority
and institutional autonomy came undone somewhat abruptly in
footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. In Hosanna-Tabor,
the Court affirmed the ministerial exception, which exempts rewaived by the claimant. But if the operative principle is a constitutional limit
on the Court’s power, then the objection to judicial inquiry into religious doctrine cannot be waived. Thus, it can be inferred that the rule of law in these
cases is structural in origin.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 18, at 1815 (“Religious entities cannot waive this jurisdictional limitation, which we believe resides most comfortably in the Establishment Clause (even as it furthers Free
Exercise values).”).
23. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547–48 (2008) (describing the conventional view of the merits/jurisdiction distinction).
24. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990).
25. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise:
The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1654 (noting the
need for courts to shift the rationale underpinning the ministerial exception
post-Employment Division v. Smith); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099,
1194–95 (“In those jurisdictions that recognize the ministerial exception, it is
unlikely to be reversed in the near future, but it is in tension with the Court’s
most recent cases clarifying the Free Exercise Clause.”).
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See infra Part I.B.
28. See infra Part I.B.; see also Esbeck, supra note 13, at 3–4; Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122.
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ligious institutions from complying with various employment
29
statutes in the hiring and firing of “ministers.” Accordingly,
much of the subsequent commentary has focused on Hosanna30
Tabor as a resounding victory for religious liberty. But the
Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor did more than simply endorse the ministerial exception. Despite the lack of briefing by
31
the parties, footnote four of the Supreme Court’s decision re32
solved a split among the federal courts of appeals and held the
following:
A conflict has arisen in the Courts of Appeals over whether the ministerial exception is a jurisdictional bar or a defense on the merits. . . . We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar. That
is because the issue presented by the exception is “whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,” not whether the
33
court has “power to hear [the] case.”

This footnote represents far more than a point of civil proce34
dure. For a doctrine to serve as a jurisdictional bar, it must
29. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (“We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”).
30. See, e.g., Richard Garnett, A Win for Religious Freedom, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench
-memos/287858/win-religious-freedom-richard-garnett;
Michael
Stokes
Paulsen, Hosanna in the Highest!, PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan. 13, 2012), http://
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4541.
31. Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289,
308, 310 (2012).
32. Compare Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (characterizing
the ministerial exception as jurisdictional), and Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of
Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Hosanna-Tabor, 132
S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (same), with Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d
Cir. 2006) (characterizing the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense),
and Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th
Cir. 2002) (same), and Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999) (same), and Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance,
878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989) (same).
33. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)).
34. In an important article, Howard Wasserman has argued that as a
matter of civil procedure the ministerial exception must be considered an affirmative defense. See Wasserman, supra note 31, at 304. Wasserman reaches
this conclusion because on his view that the ministerial exception “arises not
from an absence of core adjudicative power, but from an absence of existing
legal rules to be applied and enforced, which in turn arises from an absence of
prescriptive authority to enact those rules.” Id. If true, then footnote four of
Hosanna-Tabor fits into a larger civil procedure narrative and does not signal
a rejection of the prevailing jurisdictional view of the relationship between
church and state. While Wasserman’s claims identify how Hosanna-Tabor fits
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serve to circumscribe “the court’s raw, baseline power and legitimate authority to hear and resolve the legal and factual is35
sues” being presented. By contrast, for a doctrine to serve as
an affirmative defense, it must speak to the merits of the claim,
contesting whether the defendant’s “real-world conduct” can
36
provide “a basis for suit” or a basis for legal liability.
Thus, by conceptualizing the ministerial exception as an
affirmative defense, the Court implicitly rejected the jurisdictional approach to judicial intervention in cases implicating religious matters. Instead of viewing the ministerial exception as
into a larger civil procedure narrative, they seem to rest on a contestable view
of the ministerial exception. According to Wasserman, the ministerial exception speaks to the merits of a claim because it is premised on a “regulatory
disability” whereby “government institutions, especially legislatures, are disabled from enacting legal rules that regulate particular real-world conduct and
actors.” Id. at 303. Wasserman further contends that the ministerial exception
cannot be jurisdictional because it is not, first and foremost, related to the adjudicative disability of courts. Instead, he contends that “the limitation on judicial decisionmaking is incidental to the broader limitation on legislative
power and on the reach and scope of the substantive law Congress can enact.”
Id. at 304. It is not clear why this must be the case. In fact, it is precisely this
claim that scholars have contested when arguing that the Establishment
Clause is structural, Esbeck, supra note 13, at 2–11, and premised on an adjudicative disability, Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 134–39. Indeed, according
to such scholars, the ministerial exception is not merely incidental to “the limitation on judicial decisionmaking,” but is directly linked to the adjudicative
disability of courts to resolve such claims. And if the ministerial exception
were based on this “limitation on judicial decisionmaking,” then it would
amount to a jurisdictional bar precluding judicial resolution of such claims.
In this way, the jurisdictional paradigm provides a potential foundation
for the ministerial exception—one that cannot be rejected simply on civil procedure grounds and one that as a normative matter precludes judicial resolution of such claims. As a result, for the Court to hold that the ministerial exception functions as an affirmative defense—and not a jurisdictional bar—
represents an implied attack on the jurisdictional paradigm on normative
grounds that trace to the nature of church autonomy. Indeed, it is precisely
this move that has opened the door for judicial adjudication of religious disputes where a court had deemed the ministerial exception waived. See infra
note 44. Wasserman notes that understanding the ministerial exception as an
affirmative defense does not preclude the possibility that parties should not be
authorized to waive the defense. See Wasserman, supra note 31, at 315. However, this is not how courts addressing waiver in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor
have applied the doctrine. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680
F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the defendant waived the ministerial exception by failing to raise it in its brief before the court of appeals);
Petschonek v. Catholic Diocese of Memphis, No. W2011-02216-COA-R9-CV,
2012 WL 1868212, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2012) (holding that the defendant’s failure to raise the ministerial exception before the trial court prevented consideration of the defense on appeal).
35. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 1547–48.
36. Id. at 1548.
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a doctrine requiring judicial abstention, the Court refashioned
the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense to be asserted by the defendant that simply contests the underlying
37
merits of the claim. And as a defense to be asserted, the ministerial exception—and, in turn, the religious clauses upon
which it is based—now appears to provide an affirmative right
to religious institutions shielding them from various forms of
discrimination-based liability. Moreover, as an affirmative defense to be asserted, the ministerial exception can be waived by
a religious institution, apparently authorizing a court to adju38
dicate the dispute so long as no defense is raised. Indeed,
courts have already begun adopting this approach in the wake
of Hosanna-Tabor, holding the ministerial exception defense
waived when the defendant has failed to raise it before the trial
39
court.
Given this shift in Hosanna-Tabor, it is not surprising that
the Court struggled to articulate why individuals have no right
to accommodation from facially neutral and generally applicable laws, but institutions can avoid liability from employment
discriminations statutes. According to the Court, “a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of pe40
yote.” “Smith involved government regulation of only outward
physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects
41
the faith and mission of the church itself.” Commentators
have puzzled over the Court’s invocation of “outward physical
37. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 350 (2012) (“[T]he Court reached out to pronounce that the First Amendment’s ministerial exemption to federal employment law is a constitutional affirmative defense to the merits of a
discrimination claim and not a limit on the court’s adjudicative jurisdiction,
continuing its drive to clarify the line between jurisdiction and merits.”). But
see supra note 34.
38. See 2-8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
¶ 8.27[3] (2d ed. 1996) (“If a party fails to plead an affirmative defense when
required to do so by Rule 8(c), the defense is waived.”).
39. See Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318; Petschonek, 2012 WL 1868212, at *6.
In addition to the implications for waiver, some are predicting that the Court’s
deeming the ministerial exception an affirmative defense will have significant
impact on the costs of such litigation because “resolution of these claims will
take longer and be more expensive and contentious.” Mark E. Chopko &
Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question: Refining the Ministerial Exception
Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 233, 299 (2012).
40. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 707 (2012).
41. Id. at 697.
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acts”; is termination of an employee not also an outward physi42
cal act?
More fundamentally, commentators have struggled to explain how Hosanna-Tabor could have endorsed the constitutionally protected autonomy of religious institutions over matters of “faith and mission” and yet simultaneously
characterized the ministerial exception as merely an affirma43
tive defense subject to waiver by the parties. If institutions
are to retain autonomy over core religious matters, how then
can courts be allowed to adjudicate religious disputes where
parties have waived the affirmative defense of the ministerial
44
exception?
42. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW (Jan.
12, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/ministers-and-peyote
.html (responding to the Supreme Court’s attempt in Hosanna-Tabor to distinguish Employment Division v. Smith by querying “With due respect:
huh???”); Jeffrey Pasek, Ministerial Exemption Is Shrouded in Uncertainty,
JURIST–HOTLINE (Jan. 21, 2012), http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/01/jeffrey
-pasek-ministerial-ada.php (“arguing the internal-external distinction is new
and hardly self-explanatory,” but the “Hosanna-Tabor opinion said little to illuminate or defend it”); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 96, 104 (2011) (analyzing Hosanna-Tabor under the Smith standard); Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of SelfGovernance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016930 (analyzing the
Court’s distinction between the ministerial exception and Employment Division).
43. See, e.g., Chopko & Parker, supra note 39, at 291.
44. It is important to note here that footnote four poses a challenge to the
jurisdictional understanding of the religion clauses because it allows for the
possibility of waiver. The normative commitments of advocates of the jurisdictional paradigm have long entailed a view that parties could not waive the
ministerial exception because courts were either adjudicatively disabled from
resolving such claims or because the Establishment Clause served as a structural bar prohibiting courts from resolving such claims. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 58 n.236 (“A free exercise right could be waived by the claimant. But if the operative principle is a constitutional limit on the Court’s
power, then the objection to judicial inquiry into religious doctrine cannot be
waived. Thus, it can be inferred that the rule of law in these cases is structural in origin.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 135–36 (“The disabling effect
of the necessity to decide certain questions is jurisdictional in the strong
sense—that is, it cannot be waived or conferred by consent of the parties.”).
To be sure, some civil procedure scholars have argued that there is no
clear line differentiating affirmative defenses and jurisdictional bars. See, e.g.,
Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1454–55
(2011). On this account, some jurisdictional bars might have some attributes
typically associated with affirmative defenses and some affirmative defenses
may, at times, take on the characteristics of jurisdictional bars. This view, of
course, is not the conventional view. See id. at 1445 (“[J]urisdiction typically is
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What becomes clear in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four is that some alternative theory must animate the
Court’s vision of religious institutional autonomy. The theory
must account for the Court’s rejection of the jurisdictional approach to the ministerial exception; it must explain why the
Court appears willing to allow lower courts to resolve disputes
implicating religious matters where the constitutional concerns
have not been raised by the parties; and it must explain why
the Court sees a fundamental difference between individual
claims for accommodation and institutional claims for autonomy.
Footnote four gestures towards such an alternative theory
by reorienting our religion clause jurisprudence away from the
structural and jurisdictional limitations we place on courts and
towards the autonomy and authority we grant religious institu45
tions. This Article aims to build on this shift embedded in
footnote four by mining the Supreme Court’s articulations of
46
the doctrine in its early church property cases. In short, this
Article claims that far from the jurisdictional approaches to
church-state relations, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor lays the groundwork for reconceptualizing church au47
tonomy as a constitutionalized version of arbitration.

characterized by a rigid set of effects that place it beyond the control of the
parties: A jurisdictional rule can be raised at any time, including for the first
time on appeal; it obligates the court to police compliance sua sponte; and it is
not subject to principles of equity, waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel . . . .
[N]onjurisdictional rules usually are defined as having all the inverse effects
of jurisdictionality—they can be waived, forfeited, or consented to, and they
are subject to equitable exceptions, estoppel, and judicial discretion.”). To the
extent that courts interpret footnote four as categorizing the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense, but still having all the characteristics typically associated with jurisdictional bars, the Supreme Court’s holding in Hosanna-Tabor may not unsettle the jurisdictional paradigm. Not surprisingly,
however, courts thus far have not taken this route, concluding that the ministerial exception can be waived. See Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318 (holding that
the defendant waived the ministerial exception by failing to raise it in its brief
before the court of appeals); Petschonek, 2012 WL 1868212, at *6 (holding that
the defendant’s failure to raise the ministerial exception before the trial court
prevented consideration of the defense on appeal). And these instances of
waiver highlight why footnote four is likely to require a rethinking of the normative foundations of both the ministerial exception in particular and church
autonomy more broadly.
45. See supra notes 13–22 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Part II.
47. See infra Part II.
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The hallmarks of arbitration include two primary features:
48
(1) parties grant arbitrators authority through consent and (2)
the decisions of duly appointed arbitrators, while granted substantive deference, are subject to review for misconduct, fraud,
49
or other forms of adjudicative “naughtiness.” Importantly, the
deference and authority granted arbitrators has nothing to do
with the incompetence of courts or an attempt to emphasize the
limited nature of state power; arbitrators have authority because parties jointly choose to place their disputes within the
50
jurisdiction of an alternative forum for resolution.
In the Court’s early articulations, church autonomy followed a similar script. On the one hand, the Court originally
grounded church autonomy in the “implied consent” of the reli51
gious institution’s members. And the Court’s early decisions
recognized that the decisions of religious institutions “are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,” but
52
only after a “marginal civil court review” ensuring “the ab53
sence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.” Between implied
consent and marginal civil court review remained a space for
autonomous decision-making on the part of religious institutions. Moreover, this autonomy functioned as a right of the religious institution to govern matters properly placed within its
54
authority by the implied consent of its members. Put differently, the Court’s early church autonomy cases understood reli48. See generally Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001,
1001–03 (1996) (explaining the contractual approach to the unconscionability
doctrine used in arbitration contexts); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 145–46 (1996) [hereinafter Ware, Employment Arbitration] (emphasizing the importance of voluntary
consent in employment and securities arbitration).
49. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (listing the statutorily required grounds for
vacatur); see also Amina Dammann, Note, Vacating Arbitration Awards for
Mistakes of Fact, 27 REV. LITIG. 441, 470–75 (2008) (collecting state grounds
for vacatur); cf. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code–The Emperor’s
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (describing unconscionability
as prohibiting “bargaining naughtiness”).
50. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are
purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement. . . . An arbitration agreement is placed
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”).
51. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
52. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
53. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16
(1929).
54. See infra Part II.
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gious institutions as retaining a right to remain free from judicial interference in religious matters and a right to deference in
55
its resolution of religious questions.
Reconceptualizing the church autonomy doctrine as a constitutionalized version of arbitration provides two lines of inquiry for answering the lingering unresolved questions postHosanna-Tabor regarding the scope of the autonomy granted
religious institutions. Using arbitration as a blue print, the early church property cases limit the church autonomy doctrine to
instances where there is a basis for finding the implied consent
56
of the parties and where the institution governs and adjudi57
cates in the absence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness. Put
more simply, religious institutions retain authority over cases
where the institution’s jurisdiction can both be justified on the
58
front end via implied consent and justified on the back end via
59
marginal review for adjudicative improprieties.
Indeed, while the Court unanimously decided HosannaTabor, doing so came at the cost of leaving unresolved questions of who is a minister for the purposes of the ministerial ex60
ception and whether courts can investigate pretext in the con61
text of ministerial exception. Leveraging this emphasis on
implied consent and marginal review, an arbitration approach
to church autonomy rejects overly mechanical approaches to
55. For further discussion of the distinction between the Supreme Court’s
early and more recent church autonomy cases, see Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 494, 521–41 (2013).
56. See infra Part II.A.
57. See infra Part II.B.
58. See infra Part II.A.
59. See infra Part II.B.
60. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”).
61. The only mention of pretext came towards the end of the Court’s decision in a short paragraph dismissing the issue. See id. at 709. Significant discussion of such issues were only addressed in Hosanna-Tabor’s concurring
opinions. See id. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring) (“What matters is that respondent played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message and as a leader of its worship activities . . . . For civil courts to engage
in . . . pretext inquiry . . . would dangerously undermine the religious autonomy that lower court case law has now protected for nearly four decades.”); id.
at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to note that, in my view,
the Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and
to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies
as its minister.”).
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deciding who is a minister, instead inquiring whether a particular employment dispute falls within the core religious matters
where members impliedly consent to the self-government of the
62
religious institution.
Similarly, determining whether a particular decision of a
religious institution is pretextual should not be understood to
per se undermine the constitutionally required sphere of autonomous adjudication and self-government granted religious
63
institutions. Instead, religious institutions should receive deference over the substance of their decisions like the deference
granted to arbitrators, but courts should still employ the procedural review for fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness embraced in
the early church property decisions even as it has fallen out of
64
favor in more recent Supreme Court pronouncements.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the
doctrinal developments that gave rise to and entrenched the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses. Part II provides an
alternative vision of the religion clauses in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four. Specifically, this Part articulates how
the principles of implied consent and marginal judicial review
provide a vision of church autonomy that tracks the structure
of arbitration. Part III applies the implied consent/arbitration
model of church autonomy to some of the remaining questions
regarding the ministerial exception left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor.
I. CHURCH AUTONOMY AS JURISDICTIONAL
As an umbrella term that captures a range of approaches
to the religion clauses, jurisdictional approaches to the religion
clauses have generally shared certain important similarities.
At their core, jurisdictional theories envision a fortified wall between church and state, which captures the notion that religion
and state each inhabit different and independent jurisdic65
tions. But this “dual jurisdiction” approach often has a partic62. See infra Part III.A.
63. See infra Part III.B.
64. See infra Part III.B.
65. See, e.g., Horwitz, Act III, supra note 13, at 161–62 (“[C]ourts, and the
state itself, are simply not authorized to intervene in life at the heart of
churches. At a deep level, these questions lie beyond the reach of the state altogether. The two kingdoms of temporal and spiritual authority, of church and
state, constitute two separate sovereigns.”); Horwitz, Churches as First
Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 114 (concluding that under “a
sphere sovereignty approach to religious entities,” religious institutions
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ular spin; these “jurisdictional” approaches do not focus directly
on the scope of autonomy constitutionally granted to religious
66
institutions. Instead they focus on the constitutionally required limitations placed on governmental intervention in reli67
gious institutional life.
To some degree this emphasis on governmental limitations
as opposed to institutional rights tracked a larger shift in constitutional scholarship away from the Free Exercise Clause and
68
towards the Establishment Clause. But the factors propelling
“would coexist alongside the state . . . serving a vital role in furthering selffulfillment, the development of a religious community, and the development of
public discourse”); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of
Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 94 (1953) (interpreting the Supreme Court’s
church property cases and concluding that “the Court may have been persuaded that a church must enjoy prerogatives of sovereignty which are not to be
conceded to other social groups.”); Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or
Freedom of the Church 30–31 (San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No.
11-061, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911412 (arguing that
courts and scholars have erroneously discarded the core jurisdictional and institutional impulse behind the religion clauses).
66. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 55 (“If the law is to order two entities (‘separation of church and state’), the law must first recognize the existence of both entities. The juridical consequence is that the status of religious
entities is acknowledged by the Establishment Clause, and a sphere is reserved in which religious entities may operate unhindered by government in
accordance with their own understanding of divine origin and mission.”); Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122 (arguing that the prohibition against courts
adjudicating religious claims is not based on some constitutional desire to
“systematically protect the interests of certain classes of parties, defined by
religious mission”).
67. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 57–58 (“Indeed, in some cases it is
the religious rights claimant inviting the Court to make the inquiry into religious doctrine, and it is the Court refusing to do so. Thus, the rule could not be
vindicating a free exercise right. Some would even expand the concept of jurisdictional dismissals and dual sovereigns as encapsuling the entire law of government-religion relations.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122 (arguing
that courts avoid intervening in religious disputes because religious “claims
would require courts to answer questions that the state is not competent to
address”).
68. This shift is most vivid in some of Douglas Laycock’s continued analysis of church autonomy. Compare Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory
of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1396 (1981) [hereinafter Laycock,
Towards a General Theory] (arguing that in church schism cases “[w]hen a
secular court awards property or an ecclesiastical post on the basis of its resolution of a question of religious doctrine, it establishes the winning faction.
But this is merely a consequence of the primary constitutional violation—
interfering with the right of the original church, which included both factions,
to resolve the controversy itself.”), with Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy
Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 262–64 (2009) [hereinafter Laycock,
Church Autonomy] (considering doctrinal developments related to church au-
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this interpretive shift towards a “negative” construction of
church autonomy—that is, understanding autonomy as the absence of justified governmental authority—was grounded in a
series of doctrinal developments related to both of the religion
clauses.
A. FROM INSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT TO GOVERNMENTAL
ENTANGLEMENT
The first of these doctrinal developments pertained to the
incorporation of the Supreme Court’s newly minted entangle69
ment doctrine into the church property cases. In the early
church property disputes, the Court’s decisions raised establishment concerns, but did so in the context of the affirmative
institutional rights of religious organizations. Thus, in its 1871
decision Watson v. Jones, the Court famously stated that “[t]he
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
70
dogma, the establishment of no sect.” The Court immediately
followed this sentence with an affirmative description of the institutional rights guaranteed religious organizations:
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the
expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual
members, congregations, and officers within the general association,
71
is unquestioned.

Indeed, this strong articulation of institutional autonomy was
further buttressed by the Court’s noting that “religious unions”
retain a “right to establish tribunals for the decision of questonomy and noting that while he does “not have much confidence in the Establishment Clause as a way to do an end run around Smith,” the fact that Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), “shrinks the Free Exercise Clause
to a substantial but still undetermined extent, certainly encourages lawyers to
look for Establishment Clause explanations [for the ministerial exception]”).
69. The entanglement doctrine primarily draws from the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (describing the
third prong of its analysis as inquiring whether a statute fosters “excessive
government entanglement with religion”), and Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New
York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (inquiring whether the government regulation
at issue would result in excessive entanglement). Worries of entanglement
first appeared in the Supreme Court’s church property cases in 1976 with the
Court’s decision in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
709 (1976) (“Even when rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts there is substantial danger that the State will
become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf
of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.”).
70. 80 U.S. (13. Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
71. Id. at 728–29.
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72

tions arising among themselves.” Approximately 70 years later, the Court distilled this notion of church autonomy into a
“freedom for religious organizations,” which entailed “an independence from secular control or manipulation” in adjudicating
“matters of church government as well as those of faith and
73
doctrine.” In this way, the Court linked the prohibition
against government establishing a sect to the affirmative right
of religious institutions to establish their own method of dis74
pute resolution and self-government.
This institutional reading of the religion clauses—
understanding the prohibition against governmental establishment of religion as tied to the institutional right to estab75
lish organs of self-government —largely dissipated in the Su76
preme Court’s jurisprudence’s since the mid-20th century.
72. Id. at 729.
73. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
74. For a further discussion of this link, see Helfand, supra note 55, at
505.
75. To be sure, the Court’s decision in Watson v. Jones was grounded in
federal common law and not in the First Amendment. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1980). However, the Court’s decision in Watson was subsequently constitutionalized in
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115–16 . Indeed, the Court’s holdings and analyses preKedroff continue to be treated as contributing to the contours of contemporary
constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (“In
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, the Court converted the principle of Watson
as qualified by Gonzalez into a constitutional rule.” (citation omitted)). For a
discussion of this non-establishment issue in Watson, see Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 456–59 (2009).
76. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, from 1872 (Watson) through 1952 (Kedroff), lower courts––
taking their cue from the Supreme Court––were far more willing than modern
courts to adjudicate cases that turned on religious doctrine or practice. See
Helfand, supra note 55, at 559–60; see also Smith v. Pedigo, 33 N.E. 777, 786
(Ind. 1893) (awarding church property to a minority faction because the majority had departed from the original belief and faith of the church); Montgomery
v. Snyder, 320 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (examining the faiths,
fundamental doctrines, and practices of two Baptist organizations, and finding
each doctrinally identical); Fulbright v. Higginbotham, 34 S.W. 875, 877 (Mo.
1896) (“It . . . sometimes becomes necessary for the civil courts, for the purpose
of determining property rights of members, to pass upon questions which are
ecclesiastical in their nature.”); Cohen v. Eisenberg, 19 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (determining the plaintiff’s kosher poultry trade to have been,
in fact, kosher, and, in turn, finding the defendant’s public proclamation that
the plaintiff’s poultry trade was not kosher to have been defamatory), aff’d 24
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1940); Philomath Coll. v. Wyatt, 37 P. 1022, 1024
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Instead, the Court recast its Establishment Clause doctrine as
circumscribing judicial resolution of religious questions, thereby focusing not on the autonomous space created by the Establishment Clause, but on the inability of courts to address sub77
stantive religious claims.
Tracing the origins of this shift from institutional autonomy to judicial abstention begins with a pair of concurrences
filed by Justice Brennan. First, in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, Brennan re-characterized the Court’s
early church property cases as “requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict neutrality toward theological ques78
tions, courts should not undertake to decide such questions.”
Second, in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God of Sharpsburg, Inc., Justice Brennan
further argued that the Establishment Clause prohibited judicial inquiry into substantive theological questions: “To permit
civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power
within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide . . . religious law
[governing church polity] . . . would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of reli79
gious doctrine.”
(Or. 1894) (“It is a solemn matter to invade the domain of religious beliefs and
dogmas, to explore doctrine, and decide intangible, metaphysical questions
pertaining to the Godhead; and courts have a delicacy in entering upon this
field of investigation, and will not do so unless it is necessary for the purpose of
determining questions of civil or property rights.” (emphasis added));
Schlichter v. Keiter, 27 A. 45, 57 (Pa. 1893) (determining whether “revision [to
the church constitution and statement of faith] made a complete theological
departure from the creed of the church” the court wrote: “We have attentively
considered the suggestions made to us on the subject by the appellant, we
have examined the old and the revised confessions, we have read the testimony of the distinguished theological experts who were called to testify as to the
alleged doctrinal differences, and we are satisfied that the master and the
court were right” in deciding that there “has been no substantial departure
from the ancient belief of the church.”); Deaderick v. Lampson, 58 Tenn. (11
Heisk.) 523, 535–36 (1872) (“[S]o far as the identity of the respective claimants
with the beneficiary to whom the church property was dedicated, may be affected by their doctrines, or by the acts of the General Assembly in that case,
the essential coincidence the doctrines and the legal effect of those acts must
necessarily be considered for the purpose of deciding the question of title to the
property. These principles will sustain the jurisdiction of civil courts in cases
like the present . . . .”) (quoting Gartin v. Penick, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 110, 122
(1868)).
77. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
78. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
79. 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Reformulating the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
in this way altered the trajectory of the church autonomy inquiry away from constitutionally demanded autonomy for religious institutions and toward constitutionally required absten80
tion from judicial inquiry into religious questions. This shift
became entrenched in the constitutional landscape with the
Court’s majority opinion—also authored by Brennan—in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, where the Court
stated:
The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that
it rests upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in
dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church
81
polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes.

The rationale for this prohibition, however, was not directly
tied to the constitutionally protected autonomy of religious institutions. Instead, it rested on the fact that the resolution of
intra-church disputes “frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage” and, “in much the
same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine,”
82
would “violate the First Amendment.” Put differently, the reason why courts must defer to the religious decision of religious
institutions does not rest on the autonomy granted these institutions—such autonomy is simply the by-product of a more
basic constitutional prohibition against judicial inquiry into re83
ligious questions.
Recasting the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
raised two important questions. First, if the rationale underlying judicial deference to religious institutions lay in the consti80. Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence
of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 132–33.
81. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708 (1976).
82. Id. at 708–09 (quoting Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 369 (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
83. See Christopher Lund, The New Free Exercise Clause, 108 NW. U. L.
REV (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 43) (on file with author) (noting that
the “root of the problem” requiring dismissal of a minister’s claim for breach of
contract is not the impermissibility of judicial intervention in religious questions, but because decisions over matters of internal church governance are
properly within the constitutionally protected autonomy of the religious institutions). Disconnecting the church property cases from church autonomy became a source of significant scholarly critique. See, e.g., Adams & Hanlon, supra note 75, at 1294–97; Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 969 (1991); John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 847, 858–68 (1984).
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tutional imperative to avoid religious questions, could courts
resolve religious questions when the religious institutions before the court waived the constitutionally mandated deference?
The Supreme Court’s answer here seemed to be an une84
quivocal and not particularly surprising “no.” Indeed, the
Court was quick to couch this response in its newly announced
85
“entanglement” doctrine, explaining that judicial resolution of
religious questions violated the First Amendment “[e]ven when
rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts” because “there is substantial danger
that the State will become entangled in essentially religious
controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing par86
ticular doctrinal beliefs.” This refusal was a direct corollary of
the Court’s Establishment Clause shift; if the Establishment
Clause is interpreted to place restrictions on courts—as opposed to providing autonomy to religious institutions—then the
fact that parties voluntarily submit their religious dispute to a
court is irrelevant. All that matters is whether adjudicating a
dispute would potentially “entangle” a court in religious questions.
Inverting the church autonomy inquiry also gave rise to
another question: should courts defer to the decisions of religious institutions on church autonomy grounds where the court
can avoid resolving the underlying religious doctrinal dispute?
Here again the Court built upon in its newly minted Establishment Clause doctrine, holding that courts may resolve religious disputes so long as they rely “exclusively on objective,
87
well-established concepts . . . familiar to lawyers and judges.”
Thus, deference to religious institutions on matters of selfgovernment and adjudication was not constitutionally necessary where courts could resolve such matters without becoming
impermissibly entangled in religious questions. In the words of
the Court:
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it
is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The method . . . thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entangle88
ment in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709.
See supra note 69.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added).
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
Id. (emphasis added).
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In this way, the shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
from deference toward religious institutions to entanglement in
religious questions had two important outcomes. First, entanglement worries could not be waived by the parties to the liti89
gation. Second, where courts could avoid entanglement they
could simply ignore the internal decision making of religious
90
institutions. All that mattered from this new perspective was
whether courts would impermissibly resolve religious questions.
Framing the doctrine in this way was predicated on a
view that courts were judicially incompetent of resolving reli91
gious questions. This assumption of judicial incompetence
could be based upon two different arguments: either because
courts lacked the institutional knowledge and ability to address
92
religious questions or because courts lacked the jurisdictional
93
authority to resolve religious questions. On either count, however, the conception of the Establishment Clause underlying
the shift from religious institutions to religious questions was
jurisdictional. The autonomy granted religious institutions was
a function of the withdrawal of courts from the sphere of religious questions. Thus, courts could not resolve religious questions because they lacked competence, thereby rendering them
adjudicatively disabled from addressing claims that turned on
religious doctrine or practice. As a result, even if religious institutions wanted courts to resolve a religious dispute, courts
could not do so because they lacked jurisdiction over such mat94
ters. Put simply, the Establishment Clause worries were all
89. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 87–87 and accompanying text.
91. Esbeck, supra note 13, at 6 (“Examining the Court’s dismissals for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction further reveals the Supreme Court’s view of
the Establishment Clause. Such dismissals happen when a court is asked to
resolve disputes on topics over which the court deems itself as having no competence.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 138 (arguing that courts avoid intervening in religious disputes because religious “claims would require courts
to answer questions that the state is not competent to address”).
92. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 143–45 (noting, for example, that “[c]ourts cannot decide whether a congregation has engaged in discriminatory conduct toward a ministerial employee without first determining
a set of qualifications for holding the role”).
93. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 55–56 (“The jurisdictional consequence of [the separation of church and state] is that . . . a sphere is reserved
in which religious entities may operate unhindered by government in accordance with their own understanding of divine origin and mission.”).
94. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 436 U.S. 696, 709 (1976);
see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Set-
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about what courts could not do; they were not about what religious institutions could do. And reframing the Establishment
Clause in this way captured the core of what the jurisdictional
view of the religion clauses was all about.
B. THE DWINDLING SCOPE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The foundational changes in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence are only part of the story of how
church autonomy morphed from a doctrine about institutional
autonomy to a doctrine about governmental limitations. Another key component of this doctrinal shift lay in the Supreme
Court’s overhaul of its Free Exercise jurisprudence, most notably in its landmark 1990 decision Employment Division v.
95
Smith.
In Smith, the Supreme Court faced the Free Exercise claim
of Alfred Smith and Galen Black, both of whom were denied
unemployment compensation because they had been fired for
96
misconduct. Smith and Black, however, argued that such a
denial violated their First Amendment rights because the alleged misconduct—smoking peyote—was part of a Native
97
American Church ceremony.
Rejecting the claims of Smith and Black, the Supreme
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect indi98
viduals from facially neutral and generally applicable laws;
instead, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious practice
from being impermissibly targeted by laws for worse treat99
ment. To do otherwise, contended the Court, “would be to
tlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1589 (“The
First Amendment, with its doctrine of church autonomy, is a recognition . . .
that the civil courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the internal affairs of religious organizations.”).
95. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
96. Id. at 874.
97. Id. at 874–75.
98. Id. at 878–79 (“Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring))).
99. Id. at 877 (“It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a State would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged
in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)).
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make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
100
law unto himself.” Such a conclusion would “contradict[] both
101
constitutional tradition and common sense.”
The Court’s decision sent shockwaves through both the political and scholarly communities, leading to new waves of fed102
103
eral legislation and litigation on the one hand and scholarly
104
writing and debate on the other. Among the many questions
100. Id. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67
(1878)).
101. Id. at 885.
102. See, e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006); Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.)
1488.
103. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (finding the government failed to show a compelling
interest, under RFRA, to enforce the Control Substances Act against a religious group’s ritual use of hoasca); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511
(1997) (determining Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting RFRA, as it applied
to the states’ general authority); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) (finding a city ordinance restricting the slaughter of animals to neither have been neutral nor generally applicable under Smith); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451
F.3d 643, 663 (10th Cir. 2006) (determining “religious exercise” protected under RLUIPA extended beyond merely “fundamental” or “central” religious activities); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,
170 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 1999) (expanding the application of Smith beyond
criminal prohibitions); Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554–56 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that RFRA neither prohibited prison guards from cutting Native American plaintiffs’ hair nor from keeping them from using a sweat lodge,
though such acts deprived plaintiffs of their religious practices and customs);
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5
F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 1993) (relying on Smith, the court determined that
Ohio State’s College of Veterinary Medicine did not violate the plaintiff’s free
exercise rights when it required her to take a class which included the killing
of animals, despite plaintiff’s objection that such practice was incompatible
with her religious conscience and beliefs).
104. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79
CALIF. L. REV. 91, 91 (1991) (setting the argument in dialogue form between a
teacher and his student, Gordon presents a religious teacher lamenting over
the Smith decision, claiming the Court retreated from its precedent, “used
shoddy reasoning,” and deprived the free exercise clause largely of its significance); Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme
Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to
Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 749 (1993) (“Smith is not radically different from its forerunners; the single change made is a downward
adjustment of the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulations of conduct . . . .
Given the way in which the paradigm normally tends to devalue conduct and
elevates the interest of the state, such a change is not as startling as early
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Smith raised was what to do about the significant precedent
shielding religious institutions’ liability under employment discrimination statutes. This shield—referred to as the ministerial
exception—had for the most part been understood as based on
105
the Free Exercise Clause and subsequently adopted by the
106
federal courts of appeals. And yet, the Court’s holding in
Smith seemed at odds with the ministerial exception: If the
Free Exercise Clause did not require government to provide individuals with accommodation from facially neutral and generally applicable laws, then how could religious institutions be
shielded from liability under employment discrimination statutes? Such statutes were undoubtedly facially neutral and gen107
erally applicable.
One response to this tension was to distinguish between
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause as applied to individuals
108
and as applied to religious institutions. Along these lines, the
readings of Smith declared.”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1153 (1990) (contending
that Smith illegitimately reinterpreted the free exercise clause through normative judgments instead of through “the constitutional text, history and
precedent”); Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 181, 183–84 (1992) (claiming Smith departed from its precedent by
forgoing the “compelling state interest” requirement, and that it would befit
Congress to respond by legislatively re-broadening the application of First
Amendment protections under its Fourteenth Amendment powers).
105. The ministerial exception was first announced by the Fifth Circuit in
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court
found “that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment
relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a
church and its minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an
area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment.” Id. at 560. Prior to Smith, courts
typically followed suit and discussed the ministerial exception primarily in the
context of the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (examining the ministerial exception in the context of the Free Exercise Clause and
noting that it was therefore unnecessary to discuss the potential applicability
of the Establishment Clause); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (characterizing the ministerial
exception as primarily a free exercise doctrine).
106. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 25, at 1651 (collecting cases and noting
that “[b]eginning with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McClure v. Salvation Army, lower federal courts have uniformly carved out what has become known as
the ‘ministerial exception’ to employment discrimination statutes”).
107. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
108. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The Free
Exercise Clause protects not only the individual’s right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires, but also a religious institution’s right

2013]

CHURCH AUTONOMY AS ARBITRATION

1915

D.C. Circuit emphasized that “the burden on free exercise that
is addressed by the ministerial exception is of a fundamentally
different character from that at issue in Smith” because “[t]he
ministerial exception is not invoked to protect the freedom of
an individual to observe a particular command or practice of
his church. Rather, it is designed to protect the freedom of the
church to select those who will carry out its religious mis109
sion.” Thus, the Third Circuit noted that notwithstanding
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause still protected “a religious institution’s right to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church
110
governance.”
While some courts did highlight the fundamental difference between an individual’s Free Exercise claims and a religious institution’s Free Exercise claims, an increasing number
of judicial opinions and scholarly articles resolved the tension
between Smith and the ministerial exception by emphasizing
the role of the Establishment Clause in providing this shield
111
from liability.
One prominent proponent of this approach has been Judge
Richard Posner, who interpreted Smith as demonstrating that
the Establishment Clause—and not the Free Exercise Clause—
provides the constitutional basis for the ministerial excep112
tion. As noted by Judge Posner,
In reading into statutes of general applicability an exception favorable to religious organizations, the courts may seem to be flouting the
doctrine of Employment Division v. Smith . . . . But the ministers exception is a rule of interpretation, not a constitutional rule; and
though it is derived from policies that animate the First Amendment,
the relevant policies come from the establishment clause rather than
from the free-exercise clause. The purpose of the doctrine is not to
benefit marginal religions that, lacking the political muscle to obtain
legislative protections of their rituals and observances, turn to the
courts instead; it is to avoid judicial involvement in religious matters,
to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
462 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing approvingly the court’s analysis in Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462).
109. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462.
110. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 306.
111. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1965, 2004–05 (2007). It is worth noting that at least one court has suggested
that the ministerial exception falls within Smith’s “hybrid-rights” exception.
See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 467.
112. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008).
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such as claims of discrimination that if vindicated would limit a
113
church’s ability to determine who shall be its ministers.

Other courts have not been quite so clear in their approach to
the ministerial exception post-Smith. That being said, prior to
Hosanna-Tabor, federal courts implicitly pursued a similar approach, relying much more heavily in post-Smith decisions on
the Establishment Clause when articulating the constitutional
114
foundations of the ministerial exception. As Douglas Laycock
has noted, even though he does “not have much confidence in
the Establishment Clause as a way to do an end run around
115
Smith,”
the fact that Smith “shrinks the Free Exercise
Clause to a substantial but still undetermined extent, certainly
encourages lawyers to look for Establishment Clause explana116
tions [for the ministerial exception].” According to Ira Lupu
and Robert Tuttle, Smith demonstrated that “the ‘ministerial
exception’ could no longer rest on a doctrine of free exercise ex117
emptions,” further indicating the Establishment Clause pro118
vided a more appropriate grounding for the doctrine.
This jurisprudential migration of the ministerial exception
away from the Free Exercise Clause and toward—although not
exclusively under—the Establishment Clause further rein119
forced the jurisdictional conception of the religion clauses. As
Lupu and Tuttle note, Smith did not lead to judicial rejection of
120
121
the ministerial exception —far from it. Instead, courts and
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2008);
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006);
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304
(11th Cir. 2000); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940,
948 (9th Cir. 1999); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929
F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991).
115. See Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, supra note 68, at 264.
116. Id. at 262.
117. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 131.
118. Id.
119. Kalscheur, supra note 13, at 63–69 (describing this shift toward explaining the ministerial exception as based upon the Establishment Clause).
120. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 131.
121. See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home, 363 F.3d 299, 306 n.7 (4th
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s intervening decision in [Smith] has not abrogated the ministerial exception.”); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648,
657 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ministerial exception cases . . . extend[] beyond
the specific ministerial exception to the church autonomy doctrine generally,
and we . . . find that the church autonomy doctrine remains viable after
Smith.”); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d
1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We conclude the ministerial exception to Title
VII survives the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith.”); EEOC v. Roman Catho-
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scholars looked to the church property cases, from Watson v.
Jones through Jones v. Wolf, to locate the ministerial exception
within the larger framework of church autonomy as opposed to
simply seeing the ministerial exception as another form of reli122
gious accommodation.
This relocation also came along with a whole new analytic
framework. Doctrines like the ministerial exception were not
aimed at creating exceptions for religious institutions from facially neutral and generally applicable laws; to the contrary,
doctrines like the ministerial exception were premised on the
exclusive jurisdiction of religious institutions to govern their
123
own internal religious affairs. Put differently, religious institutions did not need exceptions from laws impacting the hiring
and firing of ministers because government did not, so to speak,
have the jurisdiction to pass laws that trespassed on the exclusive right of religious institutions to select ministers, interpret
religious doctrine, and impose religious discipline on their
124
members.
lic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.* (4th Cir. 2000) (“All circuits to have addressed the question have recognized the continuing vitality of the [ministerial] exception after the Supreme Court’s decision in [Smith] . . . .”. (citation
omitted)); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We concur wholeheartedly with
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that Smith . . . did not purport to overturn a century of precedent protecting the church against governmental interference in
selecting its ministers.”); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e disagree with appellants’ conclusion that Smith requires the rejection of the ministerial exception.”); Bogan v. Miss. Conference
of United Methodist Church, 433 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (finding the ministerial exception survived Smith).
122. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception,
90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58 (2011) (“Smith is a free exercise case. But the ministerial
exception is grounded just as much in disestablishment concerns as in free exercise.”); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 135–37 (arguing that the
ministerial exception derives from the Establishment Clause).
123. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1815, 1826–27 (2011) (arguing that post-Smith courts “can and should
clearly and carefully vindicate the ideas that religious and political authorities
are distinct, independent, and separate; and that the right to religious freedom includes the freedom of religious communities to govern themselves with
respect to matters of doctrine, discipline, and polity”).
124. It is worth noting that the Court in Smith itself appeared—although
somewhat obliquely—to support the continued vitality of the church property
cases by citing to them approvingly even as it narrowed the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause. See Brady, supra note 25, 1637–49; Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom to Be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right
of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 387, 404 (2005); Lund, supra
note 122, at 58–59.
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In this way, reaction to Smith amplified the turn to a jurisdictional conception of church-state relations. Thus, the ministerial exception was not a defense to be asserted by a religious institution against enforcement of an otherwise
applicable law; Smith undermined an analytical framework
that spoke in such terms. Post-Smith, the ministerial exception
was simply a landmark signifying the boundaries of government’s jurisdiction. In turn, it made sense to understand the
ministerial exception as representing a jurisdictional bar to the
assertion of a court’s authority.
As a result, Smith further bolstered the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses. It encouraged courts and scholars to emphasize the benefits of conceptualizing religious insti125
tutions as jurisdictionally separate from the state
and to
126
explore the benefits of this jurisdictional divide. At least until
footnote four.
II. CHURCH AUTONOMY AS CONSTITUTIONALIZED
ARBITRATION
Thus far, this Article has outlined the underlying logic and
doctrinal developments behind the “jurisdictional” approach to
the religion clauses. At its core, the jurisdictional approach understands the religion clauses as fortifying the wall of separation between church and state with each prohibited from tres127
passing on the authority of the other.
Doctrinally, this
framework could be applied in a number of ways. Most notably,
the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses understood
courts as adjudicatively disabled from resolving religious dis128
putes. Accordingly, even if both parties wanted a court to re125. See supra note 108 (collecting cases emphasizing the distinction between Smith’s focus on individual Free Exercise Claims and the rights of religious institutions that still remained beyond government regulation); supra
note 13 (collecting articles emphasizing the core jurisdictional underpinning of
the religion clauses).
126. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 60–75 (describing how a jurisdictional approach to the Establishment Clause promotes core principles of voluntarism and reinforces the limited authority of the state); Kalscheur, supra
note 13, at 91–97 (describing how a jurisdictional approach to the ministerial
exception affirmed the penultimacy of the state).
127. See supra note 65.
128. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 28–32 (arguing that the Establishment Clause provides a structural and thereby jurisdictional constraint on
government intervention in religious affairs); Kalscheur, supra note 13, at 99–
100 (characterizing doctrines such as the ministerial exception as depriving
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122
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solve their dispute, courts were constitutionally prohibited from
129
adjudicating the matter. On the jurisdictional account, parties could not wish away the incompetence of courts to adjudicate religious questions.
It is against this context that we begin to see the revolutionary—even if inadvertent—impulse in footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor. Without briefing from the parties or discussion
130
during oral argument, the Supreme Court held that the ministerial exception must be treated by courts not as a jurisdictional bar, but as an affirmative defense. Importantly, doctrines serve as jurisdictional bars when they circumscribe a
131
court’s authority to hear the dispute submitted; by contrast,
doctrines give rise to affirmative defenses where they speak to
the merits of the claim, contesting whether the defendant’s “real-world conduct” can provide “a basis for suit” or a basis for le132
gal liability.
While couched in civil procedure terminology, the Court’s
holding undermined the growing momentum behind the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses. As an affirmative defense, the ministerial exception could be waived, enabling parties to authorize courts to resolve disputes over the
133
employment and termination of religious ministers. In this
way, casting the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense
provided courts with an entrée into the regulation of religious
institutional life—so long as they received an invitation to do
so. As a result, footnote four appeared to presuppose a far more
permeable wall of separation between religion and state than
its jurisdictional predecessor.
Indeed, footnote four could not be squared with the view
that courts lack the competence to resolve religious disputes. If
courts truly were adjudicatively disabled from addressing religious claims then how could the parties waive claims like the
ministerial exception? By waiving such claims, courts would be
authorized to adjudicate the underlying dispute. Such authority would be impossible if the religion clauses were interpreted
(concluding that courts are adjudicatively disabled from resolving disputes
that turn on religious doctrine or practice).
129. See Esbeck, supra note 13, at 42–43.
130. See supra note 31.
131. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 1547–48.
132. Id. at 1548.
133. Indeed, post-Hosanna-Tabor appellate courts have already begun
holding the ministerial exception waived when not raised by the religious institution before the trial court. See supra note 34.
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to support judicial incompetence to resolve religious disputes.
To the contrary, a jurisdictional view of the religion clauses
would require courts to raise claims like the ministerial exception whether or not the parties chose to do so—an option apparently no longer available in the wake of footnote four.
Not surprisingly, commentators have struggled to understand what theory of the religion clauses might explain the Supreme Court’s simultaneous endorsement of church autonomy
in Hosanna-Tabor and also the Court’s abandonment of the ju134
risdictional paradigm.
For example, Mark E. Chopko and
Marissa Parker criticized footnote four as inconsistent with the
rest of the Court’s opinion in Hosanna-Tabor: “If the ministerial exception reflects [as the Court stated in Hosanna-Tabor] a
rule that denies to civil magistrates the power to reach ‘an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church itself,’ that issue presents not an affirmative defense,
135
but an exercise of ‘competence’ as Watson used the word.” Accordingly, Chopko and Parker simply wish footnote four away:
“[r]egardless of the label, we think these cases will continue to
present questions of ‘competence’ and therefore present thresh136
old legal questions.”
Of course, this is just wishful thinking. Footnote four presumes an alternative theory underlying the religion clauses—
one that accounts both for the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
134. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters
of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE
168, 169 (2012). Esbeck continues to argue that the Establishment Clause
provides a structural restraint on government intervention in religious institutional life. Id. However, aware that the Supreme Court has characterized
the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense, Esbeck contends that judicial inquiry into an assertion of the ministerial exception should be limited to
the “Is plaintiff a minister” question. Id. at 173 n.33. Esbeck does not address
questions of waiver.
For a discussion of the jurisdictional paradigm in the wake of the footnote
four of Hosanna-Tabor, see Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 326–30 (Ilya Shapiro ed. 2012) (arguing that footnote
four of Hosanna-Tabor is compatible with jurisdictional limitations on judicial
authority to adjudicate ministerial exception cases); Michael Helfand, The
New Footnote Four?, CENTER FOR L. & RELIGION (May 25, 2012), http://
clrforum.org/2012/05/25/the-new-footnote-4/ (arguing that footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor undermines the jurisdictional approach to the religious clauses);
Mark Strasser, Footnote Four to the Rescue? Hosanna-Tabor’s Rejection of the
Institutional Incompetence Argument 8–9 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
135. Chopko & Parker, supra note 39, at 291.
136. Id.
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church autonomy and for its refusal to adopt the jurisdictional
approach to the religion clauses.
In articulating such an alternative theory, we need not
look further than the Supreme Court’s early church property
cases, which grounded church autonomy not in the adjudicative
incompetence of courts but in the affirmative authority granted
religious institutions to govern the religious life of their mem137
bers. In articulating this conception of church autonomy, the
Supreme Court understood the authority granted religious institutions as based upon two core principles: first, that the authority of religious institutions derived from the implied con138
sent of its members;
and, second, that the decisions of
religious institutions would be reviewed by civil courts for
139
“fraud, collusion or arbitrariness.”
Thus, courts abstained
from interfering in religious disputes because the members had
impliedly consented to the authority of the religious institution
and because courts could still review the decisions of the religious institution for fraud, misconduct, or other forms of proce140
dural naughtiness.
To be sure, the early church property cases only provide
the foundational principles of an alternative view. These principles must be fleshed out and applied to contemporary concerns in order to provide a workable method for analyzing the
141
scope of church autonomy. But by building a new paradigm
on these twin principles—consent on the front end and civil
court review on the back end—the early church property cases
crafted a framework that largely tracks our longstanding sys137. See infra Parts II.A–B.
138. See infra Part II.A.
139. See infra Part II.B.
140. See Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of
Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1387 (1981) (describing this
as Watson’s “contract principle” and noting the relationship between consent
and review for fraud and collusion). Ellman also claims that the Watson decision was guided by a principle of “strict deference”—a jurisdictional principle—which he admits stands in tension with the “contract principle.” Id. at
1388. However, as I have argued here and elsewhere, Watson’s discussion of
deference should not be read as precluding the possibility of judicial resolution
of religious disputes, but as linked to the underlying logic of implied consent.
Helfand, supra note 55, at 525–29; see also infra note 260 and accompanying
text. Cf. Kent S. Bernard, Churches, Members, and the Role of the Courts: Toward a Contractual Analysis, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 545, 547–59 (1976) (discussing how principles of arbitration informed early common law conceptions
of church autonomy);
141. See infra Parts II.A.1–3 (providing contemporary applications of the
implied consent rationale).
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142

tem of commercial arbitration. Arbitrators draw their authority not from the incompetence of courts, but from the consent of
143
the parties to enter an alternative forum for adjudication.
And while courts largely refrain from reviewing the substantive
144
merits of an arbitrator’s decision, courts do patrol arbitration
proceedings to ensure that decision is not the result of fraud,
145
collusion, or other forms of misconduct.
Importantly, the two principles of consent and review are
fundamentally linked. It is precisely because parties consent to
an alternative forum for adjudication that courts must conduct
146
a review of the process. If the process does not represent genuine adjudication on the merits, then the resulting decision can
no longer claim legitimacy on the basis of the consent of the
142. Cf. Bernard, supra note 140, at 547–52. Bernard argues that principles of contract and arbitration informed early common law understandings of
church autonomy. Id. However, Bernard’s article—which predates many of the
important contemporary church property cases—links these principles to institutional autonomy by framing institutional authority as based upon explicit
and implied contracts capable of judicial interpretation without inquiry into
religious doctrine or practice. Accordingly, Bernard fits his theory within the
framework of the neutral principles of law approach. See id. at 562–67. As a
result, Bernard’s view runs contrary to the view advanced in this article. See
infra Part II.A.3.
143. See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 5
(2002) (describing the assertion that “consent to arbitration is a necessary
condition of enforcement” as a “truism”).
144. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976)
(“[Courts] should not undertake to review the merits of arbitration awards but
should defer to the tribunal chosen by the parties finally to settle their disputes.”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596 (1960) (“The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration
would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.”).
Indeed, arbitrators are granted wide authority in fashioning equitable resolutions to the disputes submitted before them. See, e.g., Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v.
EMC Nat’l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Where an arbitration
clause is broad, arbitrators have the discretion to order such remedies as they
deem appropriate.”).
145. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see also Dammann, supra note 48, at 470–75
(2008) (collecting state grounds for vacatur).
146. Ellman, supra note 140, at 1391 (“Justice Brandeis’ other qualification
in Gonzalez—‘in the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness’—also seems
to follow from the use of contract principles. A court should always be available to determine whether an organizational decision has been made in the
manner contemplated by the agreement, for otherwise the member could not
be said to be bound by it. Few agreements would contemplate decisions made
fraudulently or arbitrarily.”); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property
Disputes—Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1120 (1965)
(“[T]he consent of the members to be governed by the church authorities did
not envision fraudulent, arbitrary, or collusive action by these authorities.”).
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participants. Individuals submit to the authority of another forum because they seek merits-based adjudication and regulation performed in good faith. Parties do not consent to decision
147
making that is corrupted by misconduct.
Moreover, once we unmoor church autonomy from judicial
incompetence and instead hitch church autonomy to the consent of the parties, Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four comes into
148
focus. If religious institutional authority is grounded in an
implied agreement between the institution and its members,
then surely those very same parties can employ that same consent mechanism to authorize courts to resolve intractable religious disputes. Thus, to conceptualize the ministerial exception
as an affirmative defense also empowers religious institutions
and their employees to jointly agree to waive such defenses.
Like the authority of an arbitrator, institutional autonomy is
not inherent or mysterious—and it is not based on judicial inability to resolve the dispute. Footnote four, in understanding
the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense, opened the
door for courts to resolve religious disputes at the request of the
parties. Put differently, church autonomy functions simply as
an implied arbitration clause where religious institutions are
impliedly authorized to govern religious matters and resolve religious disputes. But because such authority is based on consent, religious parties can also opt out.
In this way, the early church autonomy cases endorsed a
constitutionalized version of arbitration. The autonomy of religious institutions derived from implied consent and courts po149
liced the decisions of religious institutions for misconduct.
But to understand how these principles might be applied to the
contemporary dilemmas of church autonomy requires further

147. Ellman, supra note 140, at 1391.
148. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012).
149. Indeed, even Carl Esbeck has conceded that the implied consent logic
of Watson does not fit within a jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses.
Esbeck, supra note 13, at 51 n.208 (“It must be conceded that in one small respect the rationale behind these cases is tied to individual free exercise rights.
Specifically, the Court implies that when an individual first joins a church, the
membership arrangement is somewhat like a contract . . . . An implied term of
that contract is consent to the resolution of any religious disputes that should
arise by the highest ecclesiastical adjudicatory. Therefore, the Court reasons,
the dissenting member’s religious rights are not violated when the internal
resolution of a dispute goes against that member. In all other respects, the
Court’s rationale is structural.”).
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elaboration and bringing these principles into more direct conversation with principles of arbitration.
A. IMPLIED CONSENT
Few concepts have played a more foundational role to the
political theory of liberalism than consent. Most pronounced in
150
early social contract theories,
philosophers such as John
151
152
Locke and Thomas Hobbes grounded their theories of political legitimacy in consent; on such accounts, it was the consent
of the governed that rendered government legitimate—a premise of central importance in the Declaration of Independence as
153
well.
The allure of consent as a cornerstone of political legitimacy stemmed from the connection between consent and autono154
my. By predicating political and legal authority on the consent of the governed, liberal political theory sought to ensure
that political and legal obligations remained a function of indi155
vidual choice and not oppression and coercion.
150. For some of the foundational secondary works addressing the primary
role of social contract theory in political theories of legitimacy and obligation,
see generally J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (2d ed. 1967); C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962);
see also Ernest Barker, Introduction, in SOCIAL CONTRACT i, vii (Ernest Barker ed., 1948).
151. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (“MEN being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and
subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own consent.”).
152. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 113 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil
Blackwell 1947) (1651) (“From this institution of a commonwealth are derived
all the rights, and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is
conferred by the consent of the people assembled.”).
153. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent
of the Governed . . . .”).
154. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1989) (“Consent is a seductive notion because it seems to explain
obligations in terms of the obligated individual’s voluntary choice.”). That consent can successfully justify political obligation, however, remains a highly
contested proposition with critics who note that individual choice is often limited because of historical circumstances and exit costs. See id. at 22−24. For a
justification of consent theory, see Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753 (2000); see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 319 (1986) (noting that a consent theory of
contract places importance on individual will and autonomy, but also promotes
other principles such as reliance and efficiency).
155. Economic theorists also emphasize consent, albeit for a different reason. See Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J.

2013]

CHURCH AUTONOMY AS ARBITRATION

1925

These considerations of consent and fears of coercion have
long framed the place of religion and religious associations
156
within political liberalism and, in particular, the American
157
political tradition. Most famously, John Locke defined the
very essence of a church as “a voluntary society of men, joining

77, 103 (2009) (arguing that economic theorists “tend to defer to consensual
transactions, not because consent does any justificatory work per se, but rather because consent is an epistemic marker, an observable indicator that a
redistribution of resources results in a non-observable increase in welfare”).
156. See supra note 150. Of course, liberalism––and especially classical liberalism––has endured significant criticism for its reliance on unproblematized
principles of voluntarism. Some of this criticism has come from feminist scholars who have emphasized that voluntarism’s presumption of exit is dubious.
See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA 82−104 (2002) (discussing cases in which multicultural
associations often work to the detriment of women); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7−24 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999)
(arguing that multicultural group rights tend to reinforce subordination of
women due to inequalities within the groups themselves); AYELET SHACHAR,
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S
RIGHTS 60–63 (2001).
Another prominent criticism of voluntarism has come from so-called
communitarian political theorists who have contended that liberalism assumes the priority of the individual instead of recognizing that individual
identity is tightly bound to social and cultural contexts––a fact that undermines claims of voluntary association. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE 204−25 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the role of traditions and virtues in
forming individual identities); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 1−24 (1996) (discussing
the public philosophy of contemporary liberalism); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES
OF THE SELF 185−98, 502−06 (1989) (discussing the complex conceptions of
modern identity); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31–63 (1983) (arguing that group membership structures all of our individual choices); 2
CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187,
205 (1985) (“[T]he free individual or autonomous moral agent can only achieve
and maintain his identity in a certain type of culture . . . .”); Michael J. Sandel,
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81,
90−91 (1984) (“To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments . . .
is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person
wholly without character, without moral depth . . . . Denied the expansive selfunderstandings that could shape a common life, the liberal self is left to lurch
between detachment on the one hand, and entanglement on the other.”).
157. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 63−67 (discussing the centrality of
voluntarism in Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 348–51
(2002) (highlighting the role of freedom of conscience and voluntarism in the
early conceptions of religious freedom and the religion clauses); David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 769, 853−58 (1991) (describing the role of volition in the writings of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison on religion and religious liberty).
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158

themselves together of their own accord” —a formulation sub159
sequently echoed by Thomas Jefferson.
It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court’s early church property cases built on this framework of consent and
160
voluntarism. In its 1871 decision Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court noted “[t]hat in so far as the law can regard them,
the powers of the church judicatories are derived solely from
161
the consent of the members of the church.” Similarly, in its
1929 decision Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, the Supreme Court explicitly grounded church autonomy in the consent of the religious institution’s members, holding that “the
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical . . . are accepted in litigation before the secular
courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them
162
so by contract or otherwise.”
And yet, Watson and Gonzalez do not employ the generic
language of consent. Instead, in language unreflectively incor163
porated into subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Watson
and Gonzalez predicate the authority of religious institutions
164
on implied consent. The shift to implied consent, of course, is
165
not novel. Political philosophers from John Locke to John

158. See JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE SECOND
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 129
(J. W. Gough ed., 1947) (1689).
159. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 101 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1893) (1776).
160. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1,
16−17 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
161. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 710.
162. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16. The court continued by noting that “[u]nder
like circumstances, effect is given in the courts to the determinations of the
judicatory bodies established by clubs and civil associations.” Id. at 16−17.
163. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 713 (2012) (quoting significantly from Watson, including the “implied consent” language); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 617 (1979)
(same); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 711 (1976)
(same); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969) (same).
164. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16−17 (referencing the implied consent of Watson); Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729 (introducing the concept of implied consent).
165. LOCKE, supra note 151, at 366 (“And to this I say, that every Man,
that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any
Government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to
Obedience to the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any
one under it . . . .”).
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166

Rawls have deployed various forms of tacit or hypothetical
consent in order to avoid some of the problems of basing political obligation on actual consent—most notably, that there rare167
ly is actual consent on the part of those governed.
But grounding the authority of religious organizations in
the implied consent of their members does say something significant about the nature of church autonomy. In the words of
Watson, “All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to
168
it.” Thus, according to the Watson Court, those who join a
church or other religious institution recognize that becoming a
member entails implicitly authorizing the institution to self169
govern and resolve internal disputes. The rationale for this
implied consent is directly tied to the substantive objectives of
religious institutions: “It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of
questions arising among themselves, that those decisions
should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, sub170
ject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.”
The key here is Watson’s argument for the unique role of implied consent in the context of religious institutions—as opposed to secular associations—which links the reason why individuals join religious institutions to the authority of religious
institutions to self-govern.
In advancing this claim, Watson built upon an argument
171
tracing back to the founding period and, in turn, to John
172
Locke. Indeed, it was Locke who explicitly connected the vol166. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971) (“It is understood as a
purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.”).
167. For further discussion of some of the problems posed by tacit consent,
see A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 274, 275–76 (1976). See also John Dunn, Consent in the Political Theory
of John Locke, 10 HIST. J. 153, 155–57 (1967) (arguing that Locke’s acceptance
of tacit consent, among other considerations, demonstrates that consent did
not play as prominent a role in Locke’s theory as typically understood).
168. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Williams & Williams, supra note 157, at 853−58 (describing the
role of volition in the founding era); see also JEFFERSON, supra note 159, at
101 (noting that individuals join a church “in order to the public worshipping
of god in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him & effectual to the salvation of their souls . . . . The hope of salvation is the cause of his entering into
it.”).
172. See Feldman, supra note 157, at 378 (“By the late eighteenth century,
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untary nature of religious institutions to the need for the mem173
bership’s consent to institutional rule-making authority. According to Locke, individuals voluntarily join churches to
achieve “the salvation of their souls,” and this “hope of salvation” serves as the motivation for “members voluntarily unit174
ing” into a church. However, Locke notes that in order to accomplish such objectives the church must “be regulated by
some laws, and the members all consent to observe some or175
der.” Thus, on Locke’s account, the membership must consent
to both be “regulated by some laws” and “observe some or176
der” —what we might see as necessary consent to the regulatory and adjudicative authority of a religious institution.
Of course, to speak of a need to consent, at first glance,
smacks of a contradiction; consent rests on notions of volunta177
rism, something that cannot be of necessity. But religious institutions aim to accomplish a unique set of goals, such as faith
and salvation, which civil society is ill-suited to achieve. Indeed, as Locke notes, civil society seeks to “procur[e],
preserv[e], and advanc[e] . . . civil interests,” such as “life, liberty, health and indolency of body; and the possession of outward
178
things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.”
By focusing its efforts and energies on “outward things,” a civil
society avoids taking sides on how its citizens should lead the
good life, leaving room for the deep value-pluralism that typi179
fies the liberal nation-state.

some version of Locke’s basic view of the nature of the liberty of conscience
had been formally embraced by nearly every politically active American writing on the subject of religion and the state.”); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption
of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831,
1858−60 (2009) (discussing John Locke’s views on church-state relations in the
context of the founding period); Williams & Williams, supra note 157, at
857−58 (noting that in defining a church, Jefferson echoed Locke almost verbatim); see also infra notes 174−78 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 174−78 and accompanying text.
174. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129.
175. Id. Examples of such necessary rules include “[p]lace and time of
meeting . . . rules for admitting and excluding members . . . distinction of officers, and putting things into a regular course.” Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 154, at 21 (noting that consent “explains obligation in terms of . . . voluntary choice”).
178. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129.
179. The association between modern political liberalism and pluralism is
most frequently associated with John Rawls. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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By contrast, religious associations are formed in order to
pursue a particular conception of the good life, tied up in specific notions of faith and salvation. To use Locke’s phrasing, “every one joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly
180
acceptable to God.” Thus, religious associations form precisely because their membership hopes to pursue a particular religious path. This is not a goal that civil society aims to accomplish; liberal civil society simply does not aim to regulate and
adjudicate in order to promote particular conceptions of faith
181
and salvation.
Indeed, members of religious communities
would likely view such intervention from civil society with deep
skepticism. Members of religious associations typically see civil
society as without authority to provide rules and resolves dis182
putes over matters that turn on religious doctrine or practice.
This is because joining a particular religious association frequently entails granting authority over religious matters to the
183
religious institution. Indeed, it might be seen as contradictory
to join a religious community, but to maintain that promulgation, interpretation and application of the relevant religious
doctrine to be within the purview of the secular nation-state.

180. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129.
181. To be sure, noting that civil society is ill-suited or does not aim to
achieve religious ends does not conflict with a rejection of the jurisdictional
paradigm that claims courts are incapable of resolving religious disputes. To
claim that civil society does not pursue religious ends speaks to its desire to
promote alternative goals, such as, for example, religious pluralism. Put differently, claiming that civil society is ill-suited to pursue religious ends is
simply a statement of what civil society desires to accomplish as opposed to
what it could accomplish. By contrast, versions of the jurisdictional paradigm
grounded in adjudicative disability see courts as incapable of resolving disputes over religious doctrine even when motivated to do so by the request of
the parties. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 14−15 and accompanying text (conceptualizing the
competing jurisdictions of church and state as dual sovereigns).
183. Some religious groups would discourage, and even condemn, submitting disputes to secular courts as an offense against the religious authorities
within the given religious community. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Religious
Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–52 (2011) (discussing the aversion to secular adjudication in Jewish and Islamic Law). Indeed, this precise issue stood at
the center of the controversy between the parties in Hosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
700 (2012) (noting that Hosanna-Tabor’s grounds for terminating Perich included “the damage she had done to her ‘working relationship’ with the school
by ‘threatening to take legal action’” (citation omitted)).
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While religious communities and associations vary in their
notions of rules and authority, the Watson Court built its theory of church autonomy on the assumption that by joining a religious community, the members impliedly consented to the
community’s authority over promulgating religious rules and
adjudicating religious disputes. As the Court explained, “it
would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion
of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them re184
versed.”
To be sure, this inference only made sense in the context of
religious institutions as opposed to their secular counterparts.
Watson presumed that individuals who join religious communities see civil society as ill-suited to promote the pursuit of faith
and salvation. Moreover, selecting a particular religious association, and thereby choosing a particular conception of faith and
salvation, frequently entails an underlying submission of religious matters to the sovereignty of the community’s religious
authorities. As put by the Watson Court, “All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this gov185
ernment, and are bound to submit to it.”
In this way, implied consent simultaneously captured the
voluntary nature of joining a religious institution and the implicit submission to the institution’s regulatory and adjudicative authority over the religious sphere. Thus, on the one hand,
186
religious institutions remain undeniably voluntary in origin.
However, religious institutions also aim to accomplish a unique
set of goals––such as faith and salvation––which civil society is
ill-suited to achieve. Accordingly, in order to accomplish the religious objectives of faith and salvation, membership also requires vesting rule-making and adjudicative authority within
the religious institution. Indeed, Locke worried that without
granting
religious
institutions
this
authority,
the
187
“church . . . will presently dissolve and break in pieces.”
Thus, by relying on implied consent, the Watson Court articulated a theory of church autonomy that was, on the one
hand, individualistic and yet, on the other hand, also provided
religious institutions with significant authority. At its core, a
184. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
185. Id.
186. See Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 68, at 1405 (“Voluntary
affiliation with the group is the premise on which group autonomy depends.”).
187. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129.
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religious institution’s authority derives from the consent of the
188
members. At the same time, the Watson Court established a
default rule that allowed courts to presume individual members had consented to the self-governing and adjudicative authority of religious institutions in the absence of actual con189
sent.
In this way, the Watson Court provided religious
institutions with a sphere of jurisdiction or sovereignty, but
190
grounded this authority on voluntaristic principles.
It is here where we begin to see how early understandings
of church autonomy tracked the arbitration model. Like the
Watson Court’s model of church autonomy, arbitration is fundamentally voluntaristic; that is, an arbitrator’s authority de191
rives from the consent of the parties. The parties choose to
exit the realm of judicial adjudication and select instead a new
forum for alternative dispute resolution. Thus, the adjudicative
authority of arbitrators is not inherent and it does not derive
from the inability of courts to resolve a particular claim; like
Watson’s version of church autonomy, it is adjudicative authori192
ty that derives from the consent of the parties.
Beyond its voluntaristic foundations, arbitration doctrine
also makes use, at times, of implied consent in order to effectuate the overall goals of arbitration. Thus, as part of consenting
to the arbitrator’s authority, parties implicitly and by necessity
grant the arbitrator power to decide any number of procedural
188. See supra notes 171−75 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
consent in religion).
189. On this point, the argument presented differs in an important way
from the argument in Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2152060. Like Schwartzman & Schragger, I locate the authority of religious institutions in the consent of the members. However, unlike Schwartzman & Schragger, I endorse the Watson Court’s heuristic of implied consent, which provides religious institutions with a wide range of
authority because of the default presumption that individuals transfer autonomy of religious matters to religious institutions as a function of joining the
institution’s membership.
190. Indeed, in many ways, this analytic move tracks John Locke’s own political theory, which employed tacit consent in order to justify political obligation in circumstances where actual consent was an impossibility. LOCKE, supra note 151, at 365−66. Locke’s theory of tacit consent, not surprisingly, has
been much maligned. See Dunn, supra note 167, at 155 (arguing that Locke’s
acceptance of tacit consent, among other considerations, demonstrates that
consent did not play as prominent a role in Locke’s theory as typically understood); Simmons, supra note 167, at 288 (arguing that “none of Locke’s ‘consent-implying enjoyments’ is in fact a genuine consensual act”).
191. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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193

matters, all necessary to ensuring that the arbitrator can accomplish the primary goal of the arbitration: to effectively and
194
efficiently resolve the dispute of the parties.
In addition, if doubts arise as to the scope of the issues
submitted to arbitration, courts resolve such doubts in favor of
arbitration; the rationale for this rule is not simply based on
standard principles of contract interpretation, but because the
substantive policies favoring arbitration enable courts to imply
195
the consent of the parties where the agreement is ambiguous.
That implied consent plays a significant role in both church
autonomy and commercial arbitration should not be surprising.
Both contexts involve the granting of adjudicative authority
over a circumscribed scope of substantive matters that would
otherwise be resolved in court. However, the actual consent of
193. See, e.g., Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Ry.
Co., 312 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Arbitrators have broad procedural discretion.” (citing Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 262–63
(1965))); Nordahl Dev. Corp. v. Salomon Smith Barney, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1257,
1265 (D. Or. 2004) (“[A]rbitrators have wide discretion in making procedural
decisions.”); see also IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT § 34.1 (1994) (describing the discretion exercised by arbitrators in the
realm of discovery); Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today:
Why Do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415,
433 (2003) (“Arbitrators have broad discretion in managing the arbitration
process, and procedural defects are not grounds for vacating an award so long
as the arbitration process was ‘fundamentally fair.’”).
194. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985) (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24−25 (1983)).
195. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995)
(“And, given the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration . . . one can
understand why the law would insist upon clarity before concluding that the
parties did not want to arbitrate a related matter.”). It is also worth noting
that implied consent animates the doctrine of separability—which allows
courts to “separate out” and enforce arbitration provisions contained in
agreements whose very validity is being challenged. See Richard C. Reuben,
First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV.
819, 849–51 (2003) (describing and criticizing the role of implied consent in
arbitration doctrine). That is, courts enforce the arbitration provision on the
assumption that given the existence of the provision, the parties would have
also submitted challenges regarding the contract’s validity to arbitrators as
well. See, e.g., Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 48, at 131 (“[T]he
separability doctrine pretends that the party also alleges a fictional contract
consisting of just the arbitration clause, but no other terms.”).
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the parties—whether when joining the membership of a religious institution or selecting an arbitrator to resolve disputes—
frequently fails to explicitly address questions regarding the
196
scope of authority granted. Thus for both church autonomy
and arbitration, implied consent fills the gap, serving as a doctrine that expands the scope of the authority or autonomy
granted in order to promote the parties’ underlying purpose.
Relying on Watson’s implied consent doctrine provides a
framework for church autonomy that employs principles of voluntarism in answering questions of scope. Indeed, the implied
consent framework can provide such guidance because it does
not link the authority of religious institutions to the incompetence of courts to address religious questions, but instead
grounds such authority in the implicit consent that comes along
with membership in religious institutions.
Of course, once we locate church autonomy within an implied consent framework, the Supreme Court’s attempts in Hosanna-Tabor to distinguish the ministerial exception from indi197
vidual claims for accommodation is far more comprehensible.
Under an implied consent framework, individual claims for accommodation look nothing like institutional claims for autono198
my. Institutions retain a sphere of autonomy to make religious rules and resolve religious disputes because they have
been implicitly granted this right by their membership. In raising doctrines like the ministerial exception, they do not seek an
exception from an otherwise generally applicable and facially
neutral rule; religious institutions simply aim to enforce the
implied agreement between themselves and their membership

196. See Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 48, at 131 (“[I]mposing
duties based on speculations about what the parties would have voluntarily
consented to is profoundly different from imposing duties based on what the
parties did, in fact, voluntarily consent to.”).
197. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (“Smith involved government regulation of only outward
physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church itself.”).
198. This claim differs from the distinction some courts have drawn between individual claims for accommodation and the constitutional rights of
religious institutions. See supra notes 108−10 and accompanying text. The implied consent framework differentiates between individual and institutional
constitutional claims because institutional claims function as a form of forum
selection clause whereby institutions are granted authority over a sphere of
claims by the consent of their membership.
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whereby they were granted the authority to adjudicate and
govern the religious life of their community.
In this way, Hosanna-Tabor accurately described that
which differentiates doctrines like the ministerial exception
from individual claims for accommodation: they protect religious institutions from “interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church it199
self.” As a result, the Court’s holding in Smith that the Free
Exercise Clause does not require government to provide individuals with accommodations from otherwise valid laws tells us
little about to what extent government can intrude on the au200
tonomy of religious institutions. Such autonomy does not derive from simple claims of accommodation; institutions retain
such autonomy through the implied consent of their members
who—joining together in the pursuit of faith and salvation—
grant the institution authority because it is the institution itself that is uniquely capable of addressing core religious mat201
ters.
Framed in this way, the implied consent model focuses our
attention on the circumstances that allow us to presume that
the membership of a religious institution has impliedly consented to that institution’s authority over religious matters. In
turn, when inquiring whether the church autonomy doctrine
ought to cover a particular set of circumstances, the implied
202
consent model asks whether—given the nature of the parties,
the relationship between the parties and the religious institu203
204
tions, and the substances of the dispute —we can conclude
that the parties impliedly consented to the adjudicative and
rule-making authority of the religious institution. To better
understand how this model would apply to contemporary conflicts over the scope of the church autonomy doctrine, consider
the following examples.
1. The Nature of the Parties: What Is a Church?
As described above, the “ministerial exception” exempts
the employment relationship between “religious institutions”
and their “ministers” from compliance with various employ199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
See supra notes 162–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162–84 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.
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205

ment statutes. While judicial inquiry into the definition of a
206
minister has received significant attention, the contours of
what constitutes a religious institution have been largely left
207
unexplored with limited case law addressing the question.
An examination of the few decisions addressing what constitutes a religious institution for the purposes of the First
Amendment uncovers two primary types of considerations. On
the one hand, courts often explore the underlying structure of
the institution in order to determine whether it is religious in
nature. For example, in Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the defendant, a hospital, should be considered a religious institution
208
for the purposes of the ministerial exception. In answering
the question in the affirmative, the court highlighted among
other considerations that “[t]he hospital’s Board of Directors
consists of four church representatives and their unanimously
209
agreed-upon nominees” and the hospital’s “Articles of Association may be amended only with the approval of the Episcopal
Diocese of Missouri of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States of America and the local Presbytery of the Pres210
byterian Church (U.S.A.).”
Similarly, in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater
Washington, the Fourth Circuit noted that the defendant’s “ByLaws define it as a religious and charitable non-profit corporation and declare that its mission is to provide elder care to
‘aged of the Jewish faith in accordance with the precepts of
211
Jewish law and customs.’” Using such corporate hallmarks in
order to define an institution as religious seems reasonable if
the underlying theory behind the ministerial exception is jurisdictional; where an institution is of objective religious charac212
ter, then it should be granted inherent autonomy. However, if
205. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (noting uniform acceptance
of the “ministerial exception” by federal courts of appeals); Alcazar v. Corp. of
the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 2010); Bryce
v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002).
206. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
207. Cf. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d
299, 309–10 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting the lack of authority on the issue in Fourth
Circuit precedent).
208. Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360,
362 (8th Cir. 1991).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310.
212. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A

1936

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1891

we approach such questions under an implied-consent framework, then our inquiry must focus less on the corporate structure of the institution and more on the extent to which the religious character of the institution was open and obvious to its
employees. For example, the court in Shaliehsabou also emphasized various ways in which the defendant conducted business such that it would be obvious to an employee that the institution was religious, explaining that “the Hebrew Home
maintained a rabbi on its staff, employed mashgichim to ensure
compliance with the Jewish dietary laws, and placed a mezu213
zah on every resident’s doorpost.” Building on this type of
analysis, a number of courts have described the touchstone of
the “religious institution” inquiry as whether the “entity’s mis214
sion is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics.”
Focusing on the extent to which an institution’s mission is
manifested in ways “clear” and “obvious” to its employees is vital from the perspective of implied consent. In order to conclude
that an employee has impliedly consented to the authority of
the religious institution, there first must be evidence that the
employee was on notice regarding the religious character of the
institution. While explicitly stating the mission of an institution in by-laws and the like does place indications of the institution’s religious character in the public domain, it provides
somewhat shaky grounds to support an inference that an employee would have impliedly consented to the institution’s rulemaking and adjudicative authority.
Individuals consent to a religious institution’s autonomy
because they recognize that the substantive religious aims of
the institution are such that they require granting the institution expanded autonomy. But without sufficient indication that
an employee was aware of the institution’s unique religious
characteristics and objectives, it is difficult to find implied consent. For this reason, an implied consent model of church auCritical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979) (arguing that where a “church acts outside this
epicenter and moves closer to the purely secular world [engaging in] churchsponsored community activities, such as adoption agencies, homes for the aged
[and] hospitals[,] it subjects itself to secular regulation proportionate to the
degree of secularity of its activities and relationships. A church acting outside
the epicenter may still enjoy some degree of first amendment protection, but
its claims may be evaluated in light of competing, and perhaps more weighty,
general societal interests.”).
213. 363 F.3d at 310.
214. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir.
2007); Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310.
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tonomy focuses more naturally on whether the religious character of an institution was clear and obvious to its employees and
not simply whether the religious character of the institution
can be located on paper.
2. The Relationship Between the Parties: Shunning
Another important context where church autonomy can
serve as a shield to liability is the practice of some religious
communities to “shun members of their religious communities
215
for failing to abide by shared religious rules of conduct.” Such
shunning typically “involves the complete withdrawal of social,
spiritual, and economic contact from a member or former mem216
ber of a religious group.”
Some victims of shunning have responded to coordinated
communal shunning by filing suit, alleging torts such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. By and
large, such lawsuits have been dismissed on church autonomy
217
grounds. As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, “[c]hurches are
afforded great latitude when they impose discipline . . . .
‘[R]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith
are and ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything
218
can be.’”
These general trends notwithstanding, courts remain divided over whether church autonomy provides a shield against
institutional liability only for conduct initiated against a plain219
tiff who is a member of the religious community or even for
conduct initiated against a plaintiff who has withdrawn from
215. Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 181 (2011).
216. Miller, supra note 9, at 272.
217. See generally Annotation, Suspension or Expulsion from Church or
Religious Society and the Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 435–36 (1951) (collecting cases stressing religious liberty as a basis for limiting jurisdiction); see
also Helfand, supra note 215, at 181; Miller, supra note 9, at 287.
218. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.
1987) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
219. See, e.g., Paul, 819 F.2d at 883; Sands v. Living Word Fellowship, 34
P.3d 955, 956–59 (Alaska 2001) (holding that shunning practices are protected
by the First Amendment in the context of a suit against non-church members);
see also Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, No. M2004-01066-COAR9-CV, 2007 WL 161035, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that
“[s]hunning is religiously based conduct, a religious practice based on interpretation of scripture, and is subject to the protection of the First Amendment”
and not differentiating between conduct committee pre-disfellowship and postdisfellowship).
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220

the religious community. Courts that have extended First
Amendment protection to include shunning of former members
or non-members of a church have largely done so by arguing
that the churches have inherent authority to engage in core re221
ligious activity. Moreover, some of the more expansive formulations of the First Amendment protections provided for shunning-related conduct have relied upon the jurisdictional bar
222
against judicial interrogation of religious doctrine or practice.
By contrast, the courts that have refused to interpret the
First Amendment to shield institutions for shunning-related
conduct against former or non-church members have emphasized the implied consent rationale at the core of the church au223
tonomy doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court of Okla220. See, e.g., Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 592 N.W.2d 713, 718
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d, Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d
590, 595 (Mich. 2000) (holding that plaintiff’s conduct evidenced his implied
consent to the church’s practices); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987) (en banc) (holding the First Amendment could shield a pastor
from claims of defamation against members of his church, but not against nonmembers); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 786 (Okla.
1989) (holding that pre-withdrawal discipline was not actionable because
plaintiff had consented to such conduct, post-withdrawal discipline was actionable).
221. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 (broadly construing the First Amendment to
provide “great latitude” for the imposition of religious discipline); Sands, 34
P.3d at 958–59 (holding that the First Amendment shields shunning practices
from liability because such practices are religiously based, deeply rooted in religious belief and motivated––at least in the instant case––by sincere religious
belief).
222. See, e.g., Anderson, 2007 WL 161035, at *30 (“If, to resolve [a] particular claim brought, a court would need to resolve underlying controversies over
religious doctrine, then the claim is precluded.”); see also Klagsbrun v. Va’ad
Harabonim, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 742 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that the defendant
could not be found liable for religious defamation because “the Establishment
Clause is implicated whenever courts must interpret, evaluate, or apply underlying religious doctrine to resolve disputes involving religious organizations”).
223. Smith, 592 N.W.2d at 718 (quoting Guinn’s logic); Hester, 723 S.W.2d
at 559 (quoting Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Nonsectarian Church,
245 P.2d 481, 487–88 (Cal. 1952)) (“It is perfectly clear that, whatever church
relationship is maintained in the United States, is not a matter of status. It is
based . . . on voluntary consent . . . it is ‘one of contract,’ and is therefore exactly what the parties to it make it and nothing more. A person who joins a
church covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits
which result from such a union he will submit to its control and be governed
by its laws, usages and customs whether they are of an ecclesiastical or temporal character to which laws, usages, and customs he assents as to so many
stipulations of a contract.”); Guinn, 775 P.2d at 779 (“Only those ‘who unite
themselves’ in a religious association impliedly consent to its authority over
them and are ‘bound to submit to it.’ Parishioner voluntarily joined the
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homa held that the First Amendment could shield a church
224
from liability related to shunning only against members.
Thus, the court noted, “[b]y voluntarily uniting with the
church, [the plaintiff] impliedly consented to submitting to its
225
form of religious government.” In turn, explained the court, a
religious institution’s autonomy is both tied to and circumscribed by the underlying logic of implied consent: “Only those
‘who unite themselves’ in a religious association impliedly consent to its authority over them and are ‘bound to submit to
226
it.’” As a result, the court concluded, the plaintiff “voluntarily
joined the Church of Christ and by so doing consented to sub227
mit to its tenets.” However, “[w]hen she later removed herself
from membership, [the plaintiff] withdrew her consent, depriving the Church of the power actively to monitor her spiritual
228
life through overt disciplinary acts.”
Of course, it may sometimes be hard to determine whether
a plaintiff has withdrawn her consent and thereby undermined
an institution’s ability to deploy the First Amendment as a
229
shield to liability. Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to determine for how long a religious institution can continue to im230
pose religious discipline after excommunicating a member.
But what is clear is that a theory of church autonomy that
grounds the authority of religious institutions in the implied
consent of its member is deeply skeptical of applying the doctrine where the individual has explicitly chosen to withdraw
from the religious community. Where the relationship between
Church of Christ and by so doing consented to submit to its tenets. When she
later removed herself from membership, Parishioner withdrew her consent,
depriving the Church of the power actively to monitor her spiritual life
through overt disciplinary acts.”).
224. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 777.
225. Id. at 779.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Indeed this is precisely the grounds for the Michigan Supreme Court’s
reversal in Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2000),
where the court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals decision because it
found that Plaintiff’s conduct evidenced his continued implied consent to the
church’s practices even though he was not a member of the church.
230. Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, No. M2004-01066-COAR9-CV, 2007 WL 161035, at *27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007) (noting that
“[w]hen a person voluntarily joins a religious organization and submits to its
governance, that person consents to the final decision by that organization’s
tribunals without recourse to civil courts. That consent includes consequences
of church discipline that flow from the expulsion process.” (emphasis added)).
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the individual and the community has been severed, there can
no longer be a claim of implied consent and therefore no claim
231
of church autonomy.
3. The Substance of the Dispute: Neutral Principles
As discussed above, the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses is tightly linked to a view that the courts are in232
competent to resolve religious disputes. In turn, it is because
courts relinquish jurisdiction over religious disputes that religious institutions are granted autonomy over religious disputes
233
free from judicial interference.
Few doctrines capture this impulse more than the “neutral
principles” approach to judicial resolution of religious dis234
putes. The neutral principles approach authorizes courts to
adjudicate religious disputes so long as they rely “exclusively
on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property
235
law familiar to lawyers and judges.” The Supreme Court has
been explicit about the link between the neutral principles approach to religious disputes and the underlying theory of judicial incompetence to adjudicate religious questions; it is because “[t]he method relies exclusively on objective, wellestablished concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges” that it “thereby promises to free civil courts
completely from entanglement in questions of religious doc236
trine, polity, and practice.”
Not surprisingly, the neutral principles doctrine has been
criticized by advocates of church autonomy as enabling courts
to intercede in religious disputes so long as they can deftly
237
avoid addressing specifically religious questions. On such ac231. Not surprisingly, Laycock––who refuses to justify church autonomy on
purely jurisdictional grounds––makes a similar point, arguing that “[a]n organization has no claim to autonomy when it deals with outsiders who have
not agreed to be governed by its authority.” Laycock, Towards a General Theory, supra note 68, at 1406.
232. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
234. See Helfand, supra note 55, at 538.
235. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Adams & Hanlon, supra note 75, at 1294–97; Mansfield, supra note 83, at 863–68. But see Brady, supra note 25, at 1643 (emphasizing
that “[t]he use of neutral principles of law permits courts to avoid entanglement in ecclesiastical questions while at the same time securing free exercise
values. Through appropriate use of secular language and property concepts,
religious organizations can specify the resolution they would prefer in the
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counts, employing the neutral principles approach amounts to
using technicalities and semantics to trespass on the sovereign
238
authority of religious institutions.
One might assume that a theory of church autonomy
grounded in the implied consent of a religious institution’s
membership would align itself with the critics of the neutral
principles doctrine. If the membership has impliedly consented
to the authority of the church, then the ability to resolve the
dispute using neutral principles should not matter. Indeed, we
might even think that this is precisely where the implied consent approach parts ways with the jurisdictional approach; judicial avoidance of religious questions is simply not something
that matters from the perspective of an implied consent approach.
But such a conclusion would be far too hasty. An implied
consent approach to church autonomy requires considering
whether or not church members intend to submit disputes that
are susceptible to adjudication on neutral principles grounds
for internal religious institutional resolution. While it might be
fair at times to think the answer is yes, there may be a variety
of instances where the fact that a dispute can be resolved via
neutral principles tells us something more fundamental about
the dispute. Recall that it is precisely because religious life
aims to achieve salvation, faith, and prayer that we can assume
individuals impliedly consent to allow such matters to be governed by a religious institution. Accordingly, the fact that a
dispute can be resolved through neutral principles may mean
that we should not be so quick to conclude that the parties have
impliedly consented to have the particular matter adjudicated
239
by the religious institution.
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s approval of the neutral
240
principles doctrine does not rest on such a justification. However, the degree to which a particular dispute or issue is suffused with religious doctrinal considerations tells us quite a lot
about whether or not the parties impliedly consented to keep
the matter within the authority of the church. Conversely, to
the extent religion can be removed from the equation in resolvevent of a dispute.”).
238. See Dane, supra note 83, at 969; see also Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1737.
239. For a similar point, see Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 118. See also Helfand, supra note 55, at 540 n.259
240. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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ing the dispute may also undermine claims of implied consent.
As a result, evaluating whether the substance of the dispute
cannot be extricated from matters of religious doctrine or practice serves as an important consideration in determining the
scope of the church autonomy doctrine.
B. MARGINAL CIVIL COURT REVIEW
A renewed focus on consent is only half of the church autonomy as constitutionalized arbitration agenda. Emphasizing
consent—or, more specifically for current purposes, implied
consent—shifts the church autonomy inquiry away from the jurisdictional approach that ties institutional authority to judicial
241
incompetence. Instead, the autonomy of religious institutions
is based upon the implied consent of their members. Members,
on this account, implicitly grant religious institutions this autonomy so as to enable them to promote the unique substantive
242
aims of religious life, such as faith and salvation.
Accordingly, by joining an institution with uniquely religious goals—what the Supreme Court in Watson described as
243
matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance” —members implicitly
accept the rule-making and adjudicative authority of the religious institutional leadership over inherently religious matters.
In this way, members of religious institutions sign implied arbitration agreements, authorizing religious institutions to govern the religious life of their members both by making rules
and resolving disputes that are linked to the core responsibility
of the institution: promoting and enhancing the religious life of
its membership.
However, basing institutional authority on the implied
consent of the membership places important limits on church
autonomy. If the membership has ceded authority to the religious institution to make rules and resolve disputes, then such
authority can only extend to good faith self-governing and adjudication. By contrast, church autonomy does not require deference to rule-making or adjudication where the results are a
function of insider dealing, misappropriation and procedurally
flawed governance. The reason for this draws directly from the
implied consent rationale; members impliedly consent to the

241. See supra Part I.
242. See supra notes 150–204 and accompanying text.
243. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
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exercise of true adjudicative and rule-making authority—it
244
would be perverse to infer implied consent to misconduct.
Indeed, in the years following Watson, both the Supreme
Court and lower courts extended the underlying logic of implied
consent, refusing to grant deference to religious institutional
rule-making and adjudication where the institutional rules and
245
decision were the result of misconduct. In fact, only a year after deciding Watson, the Supreme Court noted that the majority of a congregational church is considered to represent the
church only “if they adhere to the organization and to the doc246
247
trines.” Lower courts largely followed suit, most notably in
244. See supra note 146.
245. See infra notes 246–62 and accompanying text.
246. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872).
247. See, e.g., Taylor v. Jackson, 273 F.345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1921) (requiring
the church to act in conformity with the requirements of its own regulations
by giving the appellees notice before dropping them from church membership);
Sims v. Green, 76 F. Supp. 669, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (ruling that civil courts
have the duty to determine “the existence of the church law, whether it has
been fairly interpreted and applied, and whether there are judicatories which
have functioned in practical compliance with the law and within their jurisdiction,” and finding the defendant’s application of church law to not have been a
“flagrant violation of the laws of the church”); Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319,
328 (W.D. Mo. 1913) (“[Civil courts] will not interfere with the affairs of an ecclesiastical organization, where the rights of property are involved, unless
there has been a palpable attempt by the governmental authorities of the
church to abandon altogether the teachings of the original organization.” (emphasis added)); Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839, 846 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893)
(finding the majority of a church’s highest judicatory to have committed “[a]n
open, flagrant, avowed violation of [church law]” and, therefore, to have ceased
to be and represent the church); Boyles v. Roberts, 121 S.W. 805, 812 (Mo.
1909) (“[C]ivil courts will investigate and see that the church judicatory has
acted, and, if so, whether it has acted within the terms of the constitutional
grant of power . . . [and i]f beyond the constitutional provisions of the church,
the acts will be declared void.”); Jennings v. Scarborough 56 N.J.L. 401, 408
(1894) (finding a bishop’s order to terminate the rector of his church irregular,
and, thus, set aside the order on grounds that notice to the vestry and the rector did not conform to the requirements of church law, and that the rector was
deprived of “a hearing upon proofs presented before the committee”); Cohen v.
Eisenberg, 19 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (deciding that although a majority of the orthodox rabbinate of New York declared poultry sold in New
York was not kosher unless it had seals furnished by the Kashruth Association of Greater New York, Inc., the court refused to defer to the judgment of
the rabbinate on the grounds that the plaintiff’s poultry “would otherwise
meet every requirement to make it kosher . . . and . . . would be kosher if
slaughtered and prepared in any place in the world except the City of New
York”), aff’d, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1940); Wallace v. Tr. of Gen. Assembly of United Presbyterian Church of N. Am., 50 A. 762, 763 (Pa. 1902) (voiding the ruling of the general assembly after finding gross irregularity in the
religious court’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of church
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Brundage v. Deardorf where the court explicitly connected
Watson to the caveat that religious institutions will not be
granted deference or autonomy where their decisions are
fraudulent:
Certainly, the effect of Watson v. Jones cannot be extended beyond
the principle that a bona fide decision of the fundamental law of the
church must be recognized as conclusive by civil courts. Clearly, it
was not the intention of the court to recognize as legitimate the revolutionary action of a majority of a supreme judicatory, in fraud of the
rights of a minority seeking to maintain the integrity of the original
248
compact.

The Supreme Court made this caveat explicit in its 1929 decision Gonzalez v. Roman Archbishop of Manila, holding that
courts must treat the decisions of “the proper church tribunals . . . as conclusive” only in the absence of “fraud, collusion,
249
or arbitrariness.”
And in subsequent years, the Gonzalez
Court’s holding was widely adopted by lower state and federal
250
courts.
In this way, the implied consent framework works as a
form of constitutionalized arbitration. Arbitration, at its core, is
an alternative method of dispute resolution predicated on the
251
consent of the parties and is policed by courts to ensure the
absence of fraud, partiality, and other forms of procedural mis252
conduct. Thus, courts review arbitration awards not to pass
judgment on the substance of the arbitrator’s decision, but to
ensure that none of the statutory grounds for vacatur—grounds

law and a lack of evidence which would justify the general assembly’s reversal
of the synod); Landrith v. Hudgins, 120 S.W. 783, 811 (Tenn. 1907) (inquiring
into both the language of a church constitution and the respective doctrines
between two church organizations, determining one of the organization’s judicatory did not have the authority to unite the two bodies, and that doing so
substantially departed from those doctrines fundamental to the church’s identity); see also Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes—Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1122 (1965) (collecting cases
and noting that “[b]y 1950, the principles of Watson v. Jones, modified to minimize arbitrary action by church tribunals, though not of constitutional status,
were widely followed by state and federal courts”).
248. Brundage, 55 F. at 847–48.
249. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16
(1929).
250. Note, Judicial Intervention, supra note 146, at 1120–22 (collecting
cases).
251. See supra note 143.
252. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see also Dammann, supra note 49, at 470–75
(collecting state grounds for vacatur).
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253

that focus on process and misconduct —require judicial invalidation of the arbitrator’s decision.
These two principles—consent and review—serve as the
pillars of the implied consent model of church autonomy. On
the front end, members impliedly consent to the authority of
254
the religious institution to govern religious life. And on the
back end, religious institutional decision making is subjected to
review on grounds such as fraud, misconduct, or other forms of
255
procedural naughtiness.
Of course, this conceptual framework could not survive under the jurisdictional approach to
church autonomy. Jurisdictional approaches to the religion
clauses conceive of religion as beyond the jurisdiction of the judicial system. Thus, such approaches reject the possibility of
courts resolving any sort of claim that turns on religious doctrine or practice, including the review of the decisions issued by
256
religious institutions.
Indeed, in its shift away from the Watson and Gonzalez
line of cases, the Court emphasized this type of jurisdictional
logic, concluding that courts were incompetent when it came to
257
addressing religious questions. Focusing on judicial inability
to resolve religious questions—as opposed to implied consent to
church authority—the Court struggled to reconcile the jurisdictional approach with the Court’s own holding in Gonzalez that
the decisions of religious institutions would need to survive
258
“marginal civil court review” —that is, judicial review for
259
“fraud, collusion or arbitrariness” —in order to be granted
260
deference. Armed with its jurisdictional logic, the Court simp253. Dammann, supra note 49, at 470–75.
254. See supra Part II.A.
255. See supra notes 241–49 and accompanying text.
256. See supra Part I.A.
257. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
258. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
259. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
260. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712 (1976).
In Milivojevich, the Court also suggested that Gonzalez represented a departure from Watson by authorizing courts to review the decisions of religious institutions because Watson did not authorize courts to resolve religious questions. See id. (“[A]lthough Watson had left civil courts no role to play in
reviewing ecclesiastical decisions during the course of resolving church property disputes, Gonzalez first adverted to the possibility of ‘marginal civil court
review.’” (quoting Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 447)). However, even in Watson, the Court expressed a willingness to allow courts to review
whether a religious institution has complied with the religious requirements of
an express trust even though such an inquiry would undoubtedly require re-
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ly discarded Gonzalez, explaining in its 1976 decision Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich that:
For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a
church judicatory are in that sense ‘arbitrary’ must inherently entail
inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else in to the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical
261
question.

solving a religious question. See Watson v. Jones, (13 Wall.) 80 U.S. 679, 724
(1871) (“And though the task may be a delicate one and a difficult one, it will
be the duty of the court in such cases, when the doctrine to be taught or the
form of worship to be used is definitely and clearly laid down, to inquire
whether the party accused of violating the trust is holding or teaching a different doctrine, or using a form of worship which is so far variant as to defeat the
declared objects of the trust.”). Thus, the Court’s claims in Milivojevich about
Watson––and, in turn, the novelty of Gonzalez––seem largely inaccurate. See
also Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1852 (1998) (“The Court’s treatment of its first class of cases, express deeds and wills, is curiously dissonant
with its treatment of the latter two. If courts may not competently resolve
matters of doctrine and practice, even if these are part of a church constitution, how are those same courts competently to enforce express trusts? Standards will not be easier to apply because they appear in an express trust rather
than church documents. Given what the Court says about implied trust, perhaps a court should enforce an express religious trust against an otherwise
legitimate authority only if the breach of the express trust is transparently
clear, as with the Supreme Court’s example of Unitarians succeeding to funds
devoted to Trinitarian worship. If this limited degree of protection is appropriate for express trusts, why should courts not also protect against acts of higher
church authorities that blatantly violate standards found in authoritative
church documents other than trusts?”); Note, When Will Civil Courts Investigate Ecclesiastical Doctrines and Laws?, 39 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1926)
(“[Watson] distinguished between cases where the property involved had been
settled upon trust expressly for the promulgation of a particular set of doctrines, and cases where it had been given to the church without further qualification. There being a trust of the former type and a claim of diversion from
the fixed purposes, it was recognized that investigation and comparison of religious doctrines would be unavoidable. This dictum has never been doubted.”).
261. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713. While the Court did not explicitly overrule Gonzalez as it pertained to fraud and collusion, it cast significant doubt
on their continued constitutional viability. See id. (holding “that whether or
not there is room for ‘marginal civil court review’ under the narrow rubrics of
‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no ‘arbitrariness’ exception is consistent with” the religion clauses); see also
Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th
Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the Supreme Court left open the possibility of review for fraud or collusion, but noting the “unlikely significance this ‘open issue’ might have in some hypothetical case”); Church of Scientology Flag Serv.
Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1541 (11th Cir. 1993) (casting
doubt on the constitutional viability of judicial review of religious decisions for
fraud or collusion).
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And, such an inquiry was impermissible under a jurisdictional
approach to the religion clauses:
But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits;
recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule
that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court
inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions
262
of church tribunals as it finds them.

However, and notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s more re263
cent church property cases, we need not relegate courts to the
sidelines in any and all religious disputes. To the contrary, the
Court’s early church property cases carved out a significant—
although not expansive—role for courts in the adjudication of
religious disputes. While prohibited from interfering in the
264
substance of the religious disputes, Watson and Gonzalez —
265
266
not to mention Bouldin and a bevy of lower court cases —
envisioned courts providing a counter-balance to church autonomy by reviewing the decisions of religious institutions for mis267
conduct and fraud. Like in the context of arbitration, it would
simply be too perilous to grant deference to religious institu268
tions without some judicial safeguard. Moreover, the underlying logic of church autonomy—the implied consent of the
church membership—could only be extended to instances
where the parties received the type of adjudication they consented to—that is, adjudication free of fraud, collusion or mis269
conduct.
To be sure, the Court raises important worries in
Milivojevich. It is one thing for a court to investigate whether
fraud or collusion stands behind the decision of a religious in-

262. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
263. See Greenawalt, supra note 260, at 1853–59 (discussing evolution of
the modern view regarding the “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness” exception).
264. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16 (articulating the “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness” exception); see also supra note 260 (discussing the analytical link
between Watson and the “fraud, collusion or arbitrariness” exception).
265. Bouldin v. Alexander, (15 Wall) 82 U.S. 131, 140 (1872).
266. See supra note 247.
267. See supra note 247.
268. See Ellman, supra note 140, at 1391.
269. See supra note 146. To be sure, one could envision a religious group
that makes decisions that are expressly haphazard and lacking in procedural
safeguards. If the contours of such a process were open and obvious, then an
implied consent model would grant a broader scope of autonomy to the relevant religious institutions. That being said, it seems reasonable to adopt a default rule whereby individuals are presumed to expect—and thereby impliedly
consent—to authority exercised in the absence of fraud or collusion.
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stitution; while such an inquiry enables a court to oversee the
internal adjudication within a religious institution, the evaluation is limited to questions of deceit and sham dispute resolution. By contrast, the prospect of authorizing a court to evaluate the decision of religious institutions for “arbitrariness” is
far more fraught. In 1969, prior to the wholesale shift of Supreme Court doctrine from the implied consent model to the jurisdictional model, Paul Kauper worried that “‘Arbitrariness’ as
a standard for review is an indeterminate and flexible term.
271
Much can be poured into it.” Indeed, one can imagine that
unlike fraud or collusion, review for arbitrariness might authorize courts to reject the decisions of religious institutions on
substantive grounds. Such judicial authority would enable
courts to trespass upon the core authority of religious institutions to, in good faith, make rules and resolve disputes that
touch upon the religious life of a particular faith community.
Here again, however, relying on arbitration as a framework for church autonomy provides important guidance. Like
the “arbitrariness” review proposed in Gonzalez, arbitration
doctrine in some jurisdictions provides courts with the ability to
272
vacate arbitration awards on the grounds of “irrationality.”
270. Indeed, despite the fact that the Court implicitly criticized judicial inquiry into religious decision for fraud or collusion, some courts continue to enforce these remaining prongs of the Gonzalez inquiry. See, e.g., Askew v. Trs.
of the Gen. Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic
Faith, Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In so doing, civil courts accept
decisions of the highest religious decision-maker as binding fact, so long as
those decisions are not tainted by fraud or collusion.”); Kaufmann v. Sheehan,
707 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the fraud or collusion exceptions are not foreclosed by Milivojevich).
271. Paul G. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The
Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 374. Indeed, Kauper further concluded “it may safely be predicted that future litigation will furnish a
rich glossary on “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.” Id. Of course, this prediction ultimately never came to pass because of the Court’s shift to a jurisdictional interpretation of the religion clauses.
272. See generally Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 102–08
(1997) (discussing court applications of the irrationality standard); Stephen L.
Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 789–93 (1996) (discussing evolution of
the irrationality ground for vacatur); Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive
Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J.
105, 150–55 (1997) (providing examples of judicial discussion of the irrationality ground for vacatur). The continued viability of the “wholly irrational”
ground for vacatur was brought into doubt by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 586–89 (2008), which held that 9
U.S.C. § 10 (2006) provides an exclusive list of grounds for vacating arbitra-
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While the doctrine is not without significant criticism, courts
have largely limited its application to instances where an arbi274
trator’s award lacks any factual basis in the record. In so doing, they have continued to uphold broad deference to an arbitrator’s substantive decisions, using irrationality to capture
cases where the award bears no resemblance to the underlying
275
facts.
In this way, irrationality has served as a quasi276
procedural ground for vacating awards, only being deployed
where there is no possible substantive justification for an arbi277
tral decision.
tion awards. Compare Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur
After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1141 (2009) (arguing that the
irrationality ground for vacatur is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall Street), with Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law?
The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 172–73
(2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding was not clear as it applied to
various non-statutory grounds for vacatur, including irrationality); see also
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“We have not elaborated on what ‘completely irrational’ means, but the
Eighth Circuit has persuasively indicated that the ‘completely irrational’
standard is extremely narrow and is satisfied only ‘where [the arbitration decision" fails to draw its essence from the agreement.’” (quoting Hoffman v.
Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2001))).
273. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 272, at 793 (criticizing the “irrationality”
ground for vacatur because it “opens the door to substantial judicial evaluation
of the merits of commercial arbitration awards by a court that is predisposed
to engage in that type of exercise when confronted with an award it believes to
be grossly inaccurate or incorrect”).
274. New York case law contains the most significant discussion of irrationality as a ground for vacating awards. See Levin, supra note 272, at 151.
Courts are clear that it will not apply if there is any basis in the record for the
arbitrator’s award. See, e.g., Branciforte v. Levey, 635 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. Div.
1995) (refusing to vacate award because “[t]here was some basis in the record
for each of the arbitrator’s findings”).
275. See, e.g., Campbell v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 821 N.Y.S.2d 27, 27–28
(App. Div. 2006) (noting that while an arbitrator’s award may be vacated if it
is “totally irrational” an arbitrator’s award cannot be vacated for errors of fact
and law and, in turn, “an arbitration award cannot be vacated if there exists
any plausible basis for it”); see also Graniteville Co. v. First Nat’l Trading Co.,
578 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (App. Div. 1992) (“An arbitration award will be confirmed if any plausible basis exists for the award and mere errors of law or
fact will not suffice as a basis for vacatur.”).
276. Levin, supra note 272, at 152 (“Many of the irrationality cases relate
more to the fact-finding process than the use or misuse of principles of substantive law.”).
277. See, e.g., Loiacono v. Nassau Cmty. Coll., 692 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (App.
Div. 1999) (vacating award where an arbitrator has made findings contrary to
facts agreed upon by all parties); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Bullseye Secs.,
Inc., 738 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (App. Div. 2002) (vacating award where an arbitrator
has granted an award on dismissed claims); Levin supra note 272, at 150–51
(“[W]hile many cases refer to and seemingly recognize irrationality as a
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Such a limited use of irrationality fits with the consentbased authority granted arbitrators. A court should only intervene on irrationality grounds where an arbitrator’s award is so
far afield that the award can no longer be justified by the consent of the parties; an award that is so exceptionally disconnected from the arbitral record cannot have been authorized by
278
the parties.
Using arbitral irrationality as a blueprint, courts can similarly deploy arbitrariness in the church autonomy context. Like
arbitration, our own model of church autonomy is grounded in
279
consent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s early church property cases envisioned lower courts providing a marginal review
of religious institutional decisions before granting them defer280
ence. This limited review was meant to reinforce the underlying rationale of church autonomy; members of religious institutions impliedly consent to the institution’s authority to make
rules and resolve disputes that touch upon the substance of re281
ligious life. However, adjudication that is fraudulent or collusive—and even adjudication that is so pervasively arbitrary
that it finds no justification in the record—cannot be justified
282
by implied consent.
Along these lines, the arbitrariness exception to religious
institutional deference would function like the irrationality exception to arbitral deference. It would apply in an extremely
limited set of circumstances where the religious institution’s
decision lacked absolutely any basis in the relevant facts or
doctrine such that it gave strong indication that it was the result of some sort of procedural impropriety. As in the case of
arbitration, religious institutions ought to be granted broad
deference as it pertains to their substantive adjudication and
rule-making; by contrast, courts can play a role by policing religious institutional decisions for gross procedural improprieties
or where a decision is so disconnected from the facts and circumstances that it appears to rest on fraud or collusion. Church
ground for vacation, one has to search long and hard to find a vacation that is
actually based on a determination of irrationality.”).
278. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 272, at 107 (“Focusing on the magnitude
(and to a lesser extent on the quality) of the error satisfies the intent of the
arbitrating parties who would not condone irrational applications of the very
law they instructed the arbitrators to follow.”).
279. See supra Part II.A.
280. See supra notes 244–70 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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members impliedly consent to good faith adjudication, not to
decision making that amounts to misconduct.
III. RESOLVING HOSANNA-TABOR’S UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
Thus far, this Article has advanced two general claims. The
first of these claims is that recent doctrinal developments have
provided strong indications that the religion clauses, and in
particular the Establishment Clause, should be understood as
283
jurisdictional; that is, that the religion clauses supported a
strong separation between church and state whereby both religion and government were conceptualized as separate sovereigns each without the authority to trespass on the jurisdiction
284
of the other.
The second claim is that footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor
has undermined this jurisdictional view of the religion clauses
by conceptualizing the ministerial exception as an affirmative
285
defense. If the ministerial exception, grounded more generally in broader notions of church autonomy, is an affirmative defense, then it opens the possibility for religious institutions to
286
waive such defenses. And if such defenses are waived, then
courts may find themselves authorized to adjudicate cases that
287
rest on disputes over religious doctrine and practice.
This realization that Hosanna-Tabor cannot rest on a jurisdictional view of the religion clauses requires a wholesale
reevaluation of the theory behind church-state relations and in
particular a reconsideration of why it is that religious institutions are provided some scope of autonomy in core religious
matters. To fill the void created by footnote four, this Article
proposed returning to the doctrinal roots of church autonomy,
which conceptualized church autonomy as a form of constitutionalized arbitration; that is, religious institutions derived
their authority over rule-making and adjudication from the im288
plied consent of their members. And the rules made and decisions rendered by religious institutions were still subject to civ-

283. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
13–15 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 150–204 and accompanying text.
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il court review for procedural misconduct. This would ensure
that religious institutions were granted authority and autonomy only to the extent that their rules and decisions did not derive from foul play; indeed, tainted rules and decisions lack legitimacy precisely because members could not be understood to
290
have impliedly consented to sham religious proceedings.
Recognizing the import of footnote four—both that it is inconsistent with the jurisdictional view of the religion clauses
and that it is consistent with earlier arbitration-based versions
of church autonomy—is vital if we are to resolve key questions
that remain in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor. While the Supreme
Court successfully entrenched the ministerial exception by
handing down a unanimous decision, it did so at the cost of addressing two crucial and recurring issues that consistently
arise in church-state litigation: (1) how are courts to define who
291
is a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception,
and (2) can courts address claims that the decisions of religious
292
institutions of are in reality pretextual.
To address these thorny questions—questions that arose in
Hosanna-Tabor’s oral argument but were not answered in the
293
Court’s opinion —requires extending the logic of footnote four
by unpacking the implications of an arbitration-based model of
church autonomy and how the model deploys its key concepts of
implied consent and marginal civil court review.
A. WHO IS A MINISTER?
One of the primary issues left relatively unaddressed in
the Supreme Court’s Hosanna-Tabor decision is the persistent
question of who constitutes a “minister” for the purposes of the
294
ministerial exception.
This question has bedeviled lower
295
courts, injecting significant uncertainty into the employment
289. See supra Part II.B.
290. See supra note 146.
291. See infra Part III.A.
292. See infra Part III.B.
293. See infra notes 317, 319–23 and accompanying text.
294. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”).
295. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Circuit courts applying the ministerial exception have consistently struggled to
decide whether or not a particular employee is functionally a ‘minister.’”).
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relationships between religious institutions and their employ296
ees. Indeed, some courts have even wondered whether answering the “who is a minister” question itself impermissibly
297
entangles courts in religious questions.
Faced with this inquiry, many courts have adopted a “functional approach,” considering whether the primary duties of the
employee indicate that the ministerial exception should ap298
ply. Accordingly, courts do not exclusively look to whether the
299
employee is a minister, but whether the “employee’s primary
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or partici300
pation in religious ritual and worship.”
One of the consequences of this functional approach to answering the “who is a minister” question is the focus of judicial
inquiry on the relative importance or centrality of an employee
301
to the religious mission of the institution. The logic here is
296. Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential
Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1788 (2008) (“The difficulty
courts have in distinguishing religious from nonreligious job functions produces the second problem with the primary duties inquiry: the test creates inconsistent results that leave religious organizations uncertain whether a court
will classify an employee as a minister.”).
297. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Kozinski, J., concurring in the order denying rehearing en banc) (“Religions
vary drastically in their hierarchical and organizational structure, and it is
often a tricky business to distinguish spiritual from administrative officials
and clergy from congregation. The very invocation of the ministerial exception
requires us to engage in entanglement with a vengeance.”); see also William S.
Stickman, IV, Comment, An Exercise in Futility: Does the Inquiry Required to
Apply the Ministerial Exception to Title VII Defeat Its Purpose?, 43 DUQ. L.
REV. 285, 298 (2005) (arguing that application of the ministerial exception
leads to impermissible entanglement).
298. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); Elvig, 375 F.3d at 958 n.3 (same).
299. See, e.g., Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208; Elvig, 375 F.3d at 958 (“Other
federal circuit courts have adopted similar approaches, looking to the function
of the position rather than to ordination in deciding whether the ministerial
exception applies to a particular employee’s Title VII claim.”); Young v. N. Ill.
Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1994);
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the ministerial exception “does not depend upon
ordination but upon the function of the position”).
300. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (citing Bagni, supra note 212, at 1545); see
also Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007)
(same).
301. See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238,
1243 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rayburn); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1101 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004)
(same); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (“This [functional] approach necessarily
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sound. To the extent courts conceptualize the ministerial exception as aimed at providing religious institutions with space to
pursue their own religious missions, then the protections afforded by the ministerial exception are dependent on the cen302
tral role played by employees in the pursuit of those missions.
Accordingly, a number of courts have held that a church’s music director is subject to the ministerial exception because of the
303
central role played by music in religious liturgy and services.
Similarly, one court applied the ministerial exception to a
communications director because “[t]he role of the press secretary is critical in message dissemination, and a church’s mes304
sage, of course, is of singular importance.” In this way, the
functional approach extrapolates from the central role of the
305
minister in the religious life of the religious community —the
recognition that “the relationship between an organized church
306
and its ministers is its lifeblood” —and seeks to extend the
minister paradigm to other employees.
While there is nothing inconsistent about this approach, it
requires courts to focus on the central or important components
of a religious community’s mission in order to apply the minis307
terial exception —a trend that is likely to continue postrequires a court to determine whether a position is important to the spiritual
and pastoral mission of the church.”).
302. See infra notes 303–04; see also Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F.
Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“[T]here can be little doubt that Plaintiff’s position as the director of the Worship Arts Department of the Metropolitan Church falls within the ambit of the ministerial exception. It is clear from
Plaintiff’s Complaint that his position as Pastor of Worship Services is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
303. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th
Cir. 2006) (emphasizing the vital discretionary role played by the plaintiff, a
music director, in the religious life of the church), abrogated by HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694; EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213
F.3d 795, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[M]usic is a vital means of expressing and
celebrating those beliefs which a religious community holds most sacred. Music is an integral part of many different religious traditions.”); Starkman v.
Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the plaintiff conceded
that “for her and her congregation, music constitutes a form of prayer that is
an integral part of worship services and Scripture readings”).
304. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th
Cir. 2003).
305. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The
minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of
prime ecclesiastical concern.”).
306. Id. at 558.
307. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464 (D.C. Cir.
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308

Hosanna-Tabor. On the margins, courts may refuse to apply
the ministerial exception where the employee appears to play a
minor or marginal role in the community’s religious life. This
has particularly been the case with reference to teachers in parochial schools who do not, at least at first glance, play a signif309
icant role in religious instruction. Indeed, some courts have
refused to apply the ministerial exception where a teacher’s responsibilities overwhelmingly entail secular instruction and ex310
tremely limited religious teaching.
But such a framework appears to miss a far more fundamental point. The fact that teachers of secular subjects are also
given responsibility over religious instruction highlights that
many parochial schools resist the imposed distinction between
secular and religious instruction. To the contrary, some paro1996) (applying the ministerial exception to a member of the Canon Law Faculty because they “perform the vital function of instructing those who will in
turn interpret, implement, and teach the law governing the Roman Catholic
Church and the administration of its sacraments. Although [the plaintiff was]
not a priest, she [was] a member of a religious order who sought a tenured professorship in a field that is of fundamental importance to the spiritual mission
of her Church.”); EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277,
285 (5th Cir. 1981); Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (“Religious doctrine is a much less important factor in most hospital
personnel decisions than it is in religious school decisions to hire and fire
teachers.”).
308. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708 (“In light of these considerations—the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in
that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she
performed for the Church—we conclude that Perich was a minister covered by
the ministerial exception.” (emphasis added)); id. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring)
(“What matters is that respondent played an important role as an instrument
of her church’s religious message and as a leader of its worship activities.”).
309. See, e.g., Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 676 A.2d 580, 590–92 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996) (collecting and discussing various cases); see also EEOC v.
Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pac.
Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogation recognized
by Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 598 F.3d 668 (9th Cir.
2010), vacated in part, adopted in part, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010); EEOC v.
Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980).
310. See, e.g., Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 211, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that “the ministerial exception
does not apply in the case at bar, as plaintiff’s teaching duties were primarily
secular; those religious in nature were limited to only one hour of Bible instruction per day and attending religious ceremonies with students only once
per year”); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp.
2d 849, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (refusing to apply the ministerial exception where
the plaintiff “was not an ordained minister, the vast majority of the classes she
taught regarded secular subjects, and she did not lead in religious worship
services. Conversely, however, she was a Catechist, taught at least one class in
religion per term, and organized Mass once a month.”).
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chial schools specifically seek to provide an integrated religious
experience for their students and thereby seek out teachers
that can provide instruction in secular subjects while simulta311
neously reinforcing the religious ideals of the institution.
By contrast to the functional approach, an implied consent
model of church autonomy places far less weight on the centrality or importance of an employee’s role in determining whether
to apply the ministerial exception. Indeed, on the implied consent model, the entire focus on the “minister,” even merely as a
paradigm case, is misguided. Instead, courts should focus more
312
directly on whether, in light of the nature of the institution,
313
the relationship between the parties, and the substance of
314
the dispute, the employee should have understood that accepting employment with the religious institution also entailed
submitting to the authority of the religious institution’s rulemaking and adjudicative authority.
In this way, applying the ministerial exception is less
about the centrality of the employee in the religious life of the
religious institution and far more about determining whether
there was, so to speak, an implied arbitration agreement be315
tween the parties. To be sure, whether or not the employee
actually is a minister will play an important role in that inquiry. Moreover, if the employee does play a central role in the
religious life of the community, then it is more likely a court
should conclude that the ministerial exception applies. But, in
the words of the Second Circuit, the prevailing functional ap316
proach is far “too rigid.” Indeed, an employee can play a po311. See, e.g., Gallo, 676 A.2d at 590–92 (collecting cases where defendants
made such claims); see also EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp.
700, 706–07 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
312. See supra Part II.A.1.
313. See supra Part II.A.2.
314. See supra Part II.A.3.
315. This type of analysis was contemplated by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Trustees of East Norway Lake Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Halvorson, 44 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1890), albeit it not on constitutional
grounds. See id. at 665 (holding that the decisions of religious institutions are
“conclusive” “not because the law recognizes any authority in such bodies to
make any decision touching civil rights, but because the parties, by their contract, have made the right of property to depend on adherence to, or teaching
of, the particular doctrines as they may be defined by such judicatory. In other
words, they have made it the arbiter upon any questions that may arise as to
what the doctrines are, and as to what is according to them.”); see also Bernard, supra note 140, at 558 (discussing Halvorson and using it as a foundation for a common law conception of religious institutional authority).
316. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008).
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tentially minor role in the religious life of the institution, but
the surrounding factors—a pervasively religious institutional
culture or job qualifications that indicate the importance of religious fit even for marginal employees—might give us good
reason to conclude that the employee impliedly consented to
the adjudicative authority of the religious institution when accepting employment. Thus, on an implied consent model, courts
would look for indicators of implied consent, not hallmarks of
religious importance. While these inquiries may overlap, they
can frequently diverge in important ways, especially when it
comes to teachers providing secular instruction in parochial
317
schools.
B. PRETEXT AND “MARGINAL REVIEW”
Uncertainty regarding the scope of the ministerial exception—that is, who is a minister—was not the only problem left
unresolved by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hosanna318
Tabor. During the Hosanna-Tabor oral argument, the Justices repeatedly asked counsel for both parties whether courts can
review the decisions of religious institutions to determine if
319
they were pretextual. The worry here was two-fold. First, a
317. Cf. EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700, 706 (S.D.
Ohio 1990) (“Although it appears undisputed that the principles of the Christian faith pervade the schools’ educational activities, this alone would not
make a teacher or administrator a ‘minister’ for purposes of exempting that
person from the FLSA’s definition of ‘employee.’”); Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 676
A.2d 580, 590 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“Defendants now rely on this
stipulation [that ‘religion permeates the school atmosphere’], plus ‘The philosophy of Don Bosco Preparatory High School’ and the guide to hiring teachers,
‘Characteristics of Teachers in Catholic Schools,’ to support their contention
that all parochial school teachers, regardless of the subject taught, perform a
ministerial function. However, none of these generalized contentions support
the conclusion that propagation of the faith was an integral part of the curriculum in secular subjects taught by plaintiff.”).
318. See supra Part III.A.
319. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/10-553.pdf (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (asking petitioner how it proposes dealing with pretext in the context of reporting sexual
abuse); id. at 12–13 (Scalia, J., questioning petitioner) (“So you would allow . . . the government courts to probe behind the church’s assertion that this
[math teacher] is a minister?”); id. at 22 (Alito, J., questioning petitioner)
(worrying that pretext analysis necessarily requires judicial inquiry into the
centrality of religious teachings); id. at 39 (Scalia, J., questioning respondent)
(“Would you . . . allow the government to go . . . into the . . . dismissal of the
Catholic priest to see whether indeed it . . . was pretextual?”); id. at 43–44
(Alito, J., questioning respondent) (worrying that the pretext inquiry will, in
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religious institution might, in bad faith, claim that a plaintiff is
320
a minister solely in order to be shielded from liability; second,
a religious institution might claim that a plaintiff had been
terminated for religious reasons when in fact the termination
was motivated by various forms of impermissible discrimina321
tion. In each instance, the Justices wondered how a court
could simultaneously grant deference to the internal decisionmaking of religious institutions while still retaining the author322
ity to check such decisions for pretext or bad faith.
Despite the significant focus on the issue at oral argument,
323
the Court’s decision did little to address the question. The
primary discussion of pretext came in Justice Alito’s concurrence in which he argues that a pretext inquiry would “dangerously undermine the religious autonomy” because “[i]n order to
probe the real reason for respondent’s firing, a civil court—and
perhaps a jury—would be required to make a judgment about
324
church doctrine.” Rendering such a judgment “would require
calling witnesses to testify about the importance and priority of
the religious doctrine in question, with a civil factfinder sitting
in ultimate judgment of what the accused church really believes, and how important that belief is to the church’s overall
325
mission.”
some cases, require courts to evaluate religious scholarship); id. at 56
(Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (“So you would say with janitors, you
can get into the pretext question[?]”).
320. See, e.g., id. at 12–13 (Scalia, J., questioning petitioner) (asking
whether the courts could try whether the church’s labeling its employee a minister is a scam); id. at 55 (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (asking
whether under petitioner’s test the status of the individual matters).
321. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (asking how to
deal with cases where the religious institution fires a teacher for reporting
sexual abuse); id. at 38–39 (Scalia, J., questioning respondent) (asking whether a court may review a pretext claim where a priest claims he was fired for
threatening to sue the church, but the church argues they fired him because
he was married); id. at 43–44 (Alito, J., questioning respondent) (asking
whether the court may try the pretext issue where a female nun claims she
was not given tenured position at a Catholic University because of her sex, but
the organization claims it was based on an honest evaluation of her canon
scholarship).
322. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner); id. at 12–13
(Scalia, J., questioning petitioner); id. at 43–44 (Alito, J., questioning respondent).
323. The only mention of pretext came towards the end of the Court’s decision in a short paragraph raising the question. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct.
at 709. For further discussion, see infra notes 333–36 and accompanying text.
324. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring).
325. Id.
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Of course, this type of inquiry poses a problem only to the
extent we embrace the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional turn,
which grounds church autonomy in the incompetence of courts
326
to resolve religious questions. This is the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause prominent in Serbian Eastern Orthodox
327
v. Milivojevich and Jones v. Wolf.
But, as described above, such a jurisdictional turn stands
at odds with the implied consent model of church autonomy ar328
ticulated by the Court in its early church property cases. Indeed, the implied consent model embraces judicial review of religious institutional decisions because it ensures that the
parties receive the good faith adjudication they implicitly consented to when becoming members of the particular religious
329
institution. Thus, the Supreme Court and a variety of lower
330
courts envisioned a “marginal civil court review” of religious
institutions whereby the decisions of religious institutions
would be granted deference once a court determined that the
decision was not tainted by “fraud, collusion, or arbitrari331
ness.”
In contrast to jurisdictional approaches that tied
church autonomy to judicial incompetence, an implied consent
model demands judicial inquiry into religious questions in order to ensure that religious institutions are making rules and
332
resolving disputes in good faith.
Interestingly, the only discussion of pretext in the majority
opinion comes in one short paragraph:
The EEOC and Perich suggest that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted religious reason for firing Perich—that she violated the Synod’s commitment to internal dispute resolution—was pretextual. That suggestion
misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only
when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures
that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faith333
ful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical” . . . is the church’s alone.

In addressing claims of pretext, the majority opinion avoids
grounding church autonomy in judicial incompetence. Instead,
326. See supra notes 69–94 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 69–94 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 69–94 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 243–70 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 247 (collecting examples).
331. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16
(1929).
332. See supra Part II.A.
333. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 709 (2012) (citation omitted).
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the Court focuses on the overall nature of the dispute—that is,
the nature of the parties and the relationship between the parties—in concluding that such a matter was undoubtedly within
the core authority of the religious institution. Indeed, it is at
the end of this paragraph that the Court drops footnote four,
the ultimate renunciation of the jurisdictional interpretation of
church autonomy. In this way, the Court begins the process of
distancing the doctrine from the prevailing jurisdictional approach to the religious clauses; it both avoids arguing from judicial incompetence and simultaneously conceives of the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense, thereby opening the
door for judicial adjudication of such disputes in cases of waiv334
er.
On the heels of Hosanna-Tabor, lowers courts appear willing to pursue this new logic, interpreting the ministerial excep335
tion as an affirmative defense. In turn, court opinions are
opening the door for an increased judicial role in the resolution
336
of religious disputes. Of course, such an increased role would
never have been possible within a jurisdictional framework because religious and judicial institutions inhabit different
spheres and are not permitted to trespass on the adjudicative
territory of the other; the wall of separation simply did not allow for it. But that was before footnote four.
CONCLUSION
As many have noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor represented a strong endorsement of autonomy
337
for religious institutions over core religious matters. But Hosanna-Tabor represents a reformulation of the relationship between church and state, discarding a jurisdictional approach
that had become increasingly popular among courts and schol334. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text.
335. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318
(11th Cir. 2012); Petschonek v. Catholic Diocese of Memphis, No. W201102216-COA-R9-CV, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2012).
336. Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318.
337. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Discrimination Laws Do Not
Protect Certain Employees of Religious Groups, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-discrimination-laws-do
-not-protect-certain-employees-of-religiousgroups/2012/01/11/gIQAIbO4qP_
story.html; Jess Bravin, Justices: Ex-Worker Can’t Sue Church, WALL ST. J.,
Jan 12, 2012, at A7; Adam Liptak, Religious Groups Given ‘Exception’ to Work
Bias Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/us/
supreme-court-recognizes-religious-exception-to-job-discrimination-laws
.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
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ars. In its place stands footnote four, which embraces the
ministerial exception as an affirmative defense. Accordingly,
the ministerial exception can be waived and parties can authorize courts to adjudicate what are, in essence, religious disputes.
In so doing, the Supreme Court has presented a far more dynamic view of the relationship between church and state, constructing a wall of separation that is far more permeable than
the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses ever allowed.
This dynamic approach, however, needs its own doctrinal
and philosophical foundations. Such a foundation is readily
available in the Court’s early and long-marginalized church
property cases. Those cases built notions of church autonomy
on the implied consent of a religious institution’s membership.
At the same time, these early church property cases recognized
that if the authority of religious institutions is tied to the consent of the membership, then such authority can only extend to
good faith rule-making and adjudication. Where religious institutions engage in misconduct, there can be no claim to implied
consent and, in turn, no claim to autonomy from judicial intervention. Grounded in principles of implied consent and marginal review, this framework for church autonomy mirrored arbitration and tied church autonomy not to the adjudicative
disability of courts, but to the membership’s implicit decision to
have the religious life of their community guided by religious
authorities.
Understanding church autonomy in this way has divergent
implications. On the one hand, it authorizes courts to review
the decisions of religious institutions and authorizes courts to
withhold church autonomy where they have determined that
religious institutions have employed fraud or collusion. Moreover, it only grants autonomy to religious institutions where the
nature of the parties, the relationship between the parties and
the substance of the dispute provide sufficient indication that
the members impliedly consented to the authority of the religious institution. Such proposals would undoubtedly meet with
strong resistance from advocates of a robust version of church
autonomy.
At the same time, building church autonomy on an arbitration framework also discourages narrow constructions over
which individuals are covered by doctrines like the ministerial
exception. Once the surrounding factors justify a finding of im338. See supra notes 13, 65–67 and accompanying text.
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plied consent, then the autonomy of the religious institution is
far reaching. Whether the member is a minister or a music
teacher or a security guard, implied consent to the authority of
a religious institution serves to empower the religious institution to make rules and adjudicate disputes that touch upon the
religious life of the community. Attempts to differentiate between truly religious parties and those whose role is only of
minor religious import are irrelevant once we recognize that
the religious institution derives its authority from implied consent; such consent provides institutional autonomy regardless
of whether the plaintiff resembles a minister or not.
In this way, understanding church autonomy as a constitutionalized version of arbitration protects institutional autonomy over religious life. Where the institutional rules and decisions are truly the result of religious deliberation drawing on
matters of faith and doctrine then the church’s autonomy is
wide. Where those very same rules and decisions are based upon misconduct such as fraud or collusion then there can be no
claim to implied consent and therefore no claim to religious autonomy. Providing wide autonomy to sincere religious decisionmaking, but withholding autonomy where such decisionmaking is tainted by fraud or misconduct—this is the legacy of
footnote four.

